 Fermilab	Quality Assurance Manual	QAM 12020 July 2023
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QAM 12020: SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT ITEM (S/CI) PROGRAM

Revision History

Author	Description of Change	Revision Date
T.J. Sarlina Tom DiGrazia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Added requirements for FAR clause 52.246-26 and GIDEP reporting criteria. • Added section for procurement responsibility to flow down requirements of this chapter to subcontractors. • Added the Nonconforming item section. • Updated organization names to reflect the recent reorganizations. 	June 2023
T.J. Sarlina	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Updated definitions and responsibilities. • Added flowchart for S/CI process. 	January 2021
T.J. Sarlina	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Added SURF applicability statement. • Corrected outdated hyperlinks. 	July 2018
Rafael Coll	Initial release of QAM 12020 replacing procedure 1006 of the former Office of Quality and Best Practices. OQBP 1006 is obsolete upon publication of this chapter.	September 2013

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1.0 INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE

It is the policy of Fermi Research Alliance (FRA) to make every reasonable effort to prevent the use of Suspect/Counterfeit Items (S/CI) to ensure personnel protection, public safety, and environmental integrity, while safeguarding investments that affect the laboratory's mission. This chapter describes the activities required to identify and control the use of suspect/counterfeit items in all FRA operations and applies to all activities at the main site in Batavia, Illinois and all Fermilab leased spaces. All new and existing items, equipment, products, or parts at Fermilab are within the scope of this document.

2.0 DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS

Common item (FAR 52.246-26) – An item that has multiple applications versus a single or peculiar application.

Counterfeit item – An item that has been copied or substituted without legal right or authority to do so or one whose material, performance, or characteristics are knowingly misrepresented by the vendor, supplier, distributor, or manufacturer.

Critical nonconformance (FAR 52.246-26) – A nonconformance that is likely to result in hazardous or unsafe conditions for individuals using, maintaining, or depending upon the supplies or services; or is likely to prevent performance of a vital agency mission.

Defective item – Any item or material that does not meet the commercial standard or procurement requirements as defined in such sources as catalogues, proposals, procurement specifications, design specifications, testing requirements, or contracts. It does not include parts or services that fail or are otherwise found to be inadequate because of random failures or errors within the accepted reliability level.

GIDEP – Government-Industry Data Exchange Program

Major nonconformance (FAR 52.246-26) – A nonconformance, other than critical, that is likely to result in failure of the supplies or services, or to materially reduce the usability of the supplies or services for their intended purpose.

Nonconforming item (NC) – Any item that does not meet specified requirements. Items that do not conform to established requirements are not normally considered S/CIs if non-conformity results from one or more of the following conditions:

- defects resulting from inadequate design or production quality control.
- damage during shipping, handling, or storage.
- improper installation.
- deterioration during service.
- degradation during removal.
- failure resulting from aging or misapplication or other controllable causes.

NTS – Noncompliance Tracking System

ORPS – Occurrence Reporting and Processing System

Suspect item - An item identified through visual inspection, testing, or other means that does not appear to conform to established Government or industry-accepted specifications or national consensus standards. Or, items whose documentation, appearance, performance, material, or other characteristics may have been knowingly misrepresented by the vendor, supplier, distributor, or manufacturer.

3.0 RESPONSIBILITIES

3.1 Laboratory Director

- Delegates authority for the S/CI Program to the Office of Quality Assurance Head.

3.2 Office of Quality Assurance Head

- Appoints the S/CI Program Manager.

3.3 Suspect/Counterfeit Item Program Manager

- Recommends S/CI notification to the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) via the Fermi Site Office (FSO) when required.
- Is the point of contact for Procurement in the event of an S/CI investigation.
- Provides support to line management, S/CI Coordinators, and Division Safety Officers (DSO's) in resolving open S/CI issues.
- Requests subject matter expert (SME) guidance from the relevant laboratory safety subcommittee chairs when S/CI discoveries or reports require a laboratory response.
- Provides periodic status reports to management as appropriate.
- Files S/CI & NC reports to appropriate DOE databases including GIDEP, ORPS, NTS, etc.
- Maintains training materials and provides training as required.
- Conduct trend analysis for use in improving the S/CI prevention process.
- Ensure required entries are made to iTrack and that reported S/CIs are tracked to completion.

3.4 Procurement Manager for Operations (PMO)

- Perform searches of Purchase order database at the request of the S/CI Program Manager to determine if there is evidence that S/CI components have been ordered or received on site.
- Responsible to flow down the requirements of this chapter to the appropriate subcontractors.

3.5 Procurement Specialist

- Act as the liaison between FRA and suppliers to determine actions to be taken (i.e. credit, refund, or replacement) in the event that S/CI components are identified on site.

3.6 Associate Lab Directors/Division Directors and Project Managers (ALD/DD/PM)

- Ensure compliance with this procedure for their areas of responsibility including flow down of requirements and awareness.
- Ensure individuals within their ALD/DD/PM are trained in S/CI where required.
- Appoint S/CI Coordinator(s) for their organization.

3.7 Suspect/Counterfeit Item Coordinators

- Complete the required S/CI training course.
- Inform appropriate line management when an S/CI event occurs.
- Coordinate S/CI investigations with line management and S/CI Program Manager.
- Verify suspect parts are tagged/identified and segregated or isolated from inadvertent use.
- Notify S/CI Program Manager and DSO if parts are deemed a safety risk.
- [List of current Directorate, Division, and Project S/CI Coordinators](#)

3.8 Supervisors, Construction Coordinators and Task Managers

- Notify S/CI PM and relevant ALD/DD/PM S/CI Coordinator of potential S/CI.
- Complete the S/CI training course.
- Ensure that S/CI-related information is provided to all employees, subcontractors and users working under their direction as appropriate, either through formal training or documented transfer of information by an S/CI-trained FRA employee.

3.9 Employees and Users

- Be vigilant to detect and report suspect/counterfeit items according to FRA procedures.

- Understand the consequences of incorporating suspect/counterfeit material into the laboratory operations.
- Be aware of items that are likely to be suspect/counterfeit as appropriate for their job duties.
- Attend training in S/CI awareness as it pertains to their work.
- Notify their immediate supervisor when a potential S/CI is discovered.

4.0 PROCEDURES FOR CONTROLLING IDENTIFIED S/CI

This section describes the step-by-step procedure for managing S/CI upon identification at Fermilab or a leased space. For a discussion of items which are prone to be counterfeited, refer to [Technical Appendix A](#) below. A nonconforming item that does not meet specified requirements is not automatically suspect unless there is evidence suggesting that it meets the definition of a suspect item or counterfeit item in the Definitions above. Items that are strictly nonconforming should follow the process described in Section [5.0](#).

Purchasing equipment from what is defined as reputable companies is not in itself protection against S/CI. Many reputable companies purchase components from outside suppliers and may fall victim to unscrupulous practices.

Note: FRA personnel SHALL NOT contact the supplier of a potential S/CI without concurrence from the Chief Safety Officer, the Office of Quality Assurance Head, and the Head of Procurement.

4.1 Preventing S/CI

The first step in preventing suspect/counterfeit items from entering the production process lies with engineering controls. Engineering involvement in the development of procurement specifications and the selection of industry consensus standards play key roles in controlling S/CI. When developing the procurement specification, technical and quality assurance requirements should be identified and included.

Early identification of S/CI items via incoming inspection and testing is also key to prevent the introduction of S/CI items. Only those items that comply with the procurement specification, consensus standards, and commonly accepted industry practices should be accepted.

When maintaining, replacing, or modifying equipment, inspect for S/CI items in order to prevent continued use.

Review of existing lessons learned reports and submittal of new lessons learned reports is another mechanism for use in improving the S/CI prevention.

4.2 Identification of S/CI at Fermilab or Leased Spaces

An individual identifies a potential S/CI, stops work associated with the S/CI, and notifies their immediate supervisor. The steps are listed below as well as on the flowchart in Figure 1.

4.2.1 Segregate S/CI, Notify ALD/DD/PM, S/CI Coordinator, and S/CI Program Manager, and Investigate Item

The supervisor segregates the potential S/CI item when practical. The appropriate S/CI

Coordinator and S/CI Program Manager are then notified of the potential item.

The S/CI Program Manager, S/CI Coordinator, and line management, with SME and engineering participation as appropriate, complete an investigation and reach a conclusion indicating whether the item is counterfeit or nonconforming.

If it is not practicable to segregate the item (e.g. - due to the nature of the item or because it is installed), line management will notify others in the area about the presence of S/CI. The supervisor ensures that work associated with the item is not resumed until an investigation has been completed and the item has been evaluated by engineering or some other subject matter expert (SME). The engineer or SME will assist in determining the item's final disposition.

4.2.2 Tagging the item, preparing GIDEP Report, notifying FSO/ORPS Manager, and creating an iTrack Review.

If the item is determined to be counterfeit, it is identified as such by applying a standard FRA S/CI tag available in the stockroom, to prevent further use. The hyperlink for the tags can be found in Section 9.0 below.

The S/CI Program Manager prepares a GIDEP report as per FAR 52.246-26 and notifies the FSO and ORPS Manager to determine reportability.

The S/CI Program Manager has the responsibility to ensure an iTrack Review is created to document the S/CI event. The iTrack Review ID number shall be recorded on the S/CI tag, if possible.

4.2.3 Determine Other Impacted Areas

The S/CI Program Manager works with procurement, DSOs, and S/CI Coordinators to determine if any other areas may be impacted. If other areas are impacted, knowledgeable personnel will inspect these areas for additional items. The S/CI Program Manager is informed of the search results.

If no other items are found, the S/CI Program Manager disposes of the initial item in accordance with DOE instructions. The S/CI Program Manager also notifies the appropriate Procurement Specialist, who contacts the supplier for credit, refund, or replacement.

If additional items are found, they are collected and/or inventoried, and tagged with an S/CI tag. The S/CI Program Manager then notifies the appropriate Procurement Specialist, who contacts the supplier for credit, refund, or replacement.

If the items are not in use, they are quarantined to ensure they do not get into the supply chain. The S/CI Program Manager then disposes of the items in accordance with DOE instructions.

4.2.4 Evaluating ES&H Concerns

If the counterfeit items are in use, the DSO and S/CI Coordinator determine if there is an ES&H risk present that requires shut down. This evaluation must consider potential risks to the environment, the public, and workers. The S/CI Program Manager and area manager(s) must be notified with the conclusions of this assessment.

If it's determined that there is no such risk, the counterfeit items are replaced at the first opportunity, tagged with an S/CI Tag, and turned over to the S/CI Program Manager.

If there is an ES&H risk present that requires shutdown, the Division Safety Officer (DSO) immediately notifies the area manager(s) and shuts down the equipment or system. The counterfeit items are replaced, tagged with an S/CI Tag, and turned over to the S/CI Program Manager.

The S/CI Program Manager disposes the counterfeit items in accordance with DOE instructions.

4.2.5 Updating and Closing the iTrack Review

The S/CI Program Manager ensures that the iTrack Review is updated with new information as it is identified. Upon disposition of all S/CI items(s), the iTrack Review is updated with this information along with the actions that were taken and is closed out.

4.2.6 Notification to the DOE Office of the Inspector General

[DOE Order 221.1B](#) requires DOE contractors to report instances of suspected fraud, waste, and abuse to the Office of the Inspector General (OIG). This all-encompassing requirement includes S/CIs. Reporting S/CIs pursuant to other DOE directives (i.e. ORPS) does not substitute for reporting S/CIs to the OIG. This is the responsibility of the S/CI Program Manager.

Suspect/Counterfeit Item Discovered at Fermilab or Leased Spaces Flowchart




Figure 1

4.3 Notification of S/CI From Outside Sources

On occasion, we receive notification about S/CI from other sources. This could be a manufacturer, another DOE laboratory, or from DOE Headquarters. If the Office of Quality Assurance receives notice of S/CI discovered elsewhere, they will contact S/CI Coordinators to ensure an inspection is conducted.

If items are discovered during the inspection, the S/CI Coordinator and line management ensure that it is managed in accordance with the procedures outlined in this chapter. The process is much the same as if we discover an item on site but there are a few differences. Refer to the flowchart below in Figure 2.

Notification of Suspect/Counterfeit Item From Outside Source Flowchart




Figure 2

5.0 PROCEDURES FOR CONTROLLING NONCONFORMING ITEMS

This section describes the step-by-step procedure for managing nonconforming items upon identification. A nonconforming item that does not meet specified requirements is different than S/CI as long as there is no evidence suggesting that it has been tampered with or altered in some way. Refer to the Definitions section above.

5.1 Discovery of a Nonconforming Item

When a common item or component is found that appears to not meet stated requirements, it should be segregated until the D/D/P S/CI Coordinator is informed and an investigation is conducted. The flowchart in Figure 3 below shows the process that should be followed.


5.2 Notify the S/CI Program Manager

If the investigation warrants, contact the S/CI PM with the details of the issue. The S/CI PM will work with the D/D/P Coordinator and/or the appropriate SME to determine if the item/issue should be reported to the GIDEP, ORPS, or NTS reporting systems.

5.3 Reporting Requirements

Any reports that are submitted to any of the DOE reporting systems will be written by the S/CI PM and uploaded with the assistance of the appropriate FRA program managers. Actions requiring follow up will be entered into iTrack by the S/CI PM and assigned to the appropriate responsible party(ies).

Nonconforming Item Discovered at Fermilab or Lease Spaces Flowchart



1. "Item" as defined in DOE O 414.1D, Quality Assurance
 2. "Common Item" as defined in FAR 52.246-26, Reporting Nonconforming Items
 3. ORPS (Occurrence Reporting and Processing System), see DOE O 232.2A, Occurrence Reporting and Processing of Operations Information and FESHM 3010
 4. "Defective Item" as defined in DOE O 232.2A, Occurrence Reporting and Processing of Operations Information
 5. "Critical nonconformance" as defined in FAR 52.246-26, Reporting Nonconforming Items
 6. "Major nonconformance" as defined in FAR 52.246-26, Reporting Nonconforming Items

Figure 3

6.0 Flow down to Subcontractors

Subcontracts may flow down language such as one of the examples below when a procurement is for Items subject to higher-level quality standards in accordance with FAR 52.246-11, Higher-Level Contract Quality Requirements – excluding subcontracts for commercial items, international contracts, and certain medical devices regulated by the FDA (reference 21 CFR 803):

EXAMPLE 1: “The Federal Acquisition Regulation clause FAR 52.246-26, Reporting Non-Conforming Items (DEC 2019) is incorporated by reference as part of this Purchase Order.”

EXAMPLE 2: “FAR 52.246-26 Reporting Nonconforming Items is hereby incorporated by reference. Major or critical nonconformances that are identified by the Subcontractor and are reported to GIDEP per FAR 52.246-26 are not required to be reported to (*SUBCONTRACTOR NAME*) unless otherwise stated in the subcontract. Suspect or Counterfeit items (S/CI) identified and reported to GIDEP must be reported to (*SUBCONTRACTOR NAME*) per the S/CI clause in this subcontract.”

Contract general provisions may flow down language such as the example below:

“Under its DOE Prime Contract, Fermilab is required to notify its Contracting Officer and submit a report to the Government-Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP) of any suspect/counterfeit items or common items that have major or critical nonconformance as required by Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 52.246-26, Reporting Nonconforming Items.”

7.0 REFERENCES

- 7.1.1 [Fermilab Environment Safety & Health Manual \(FESHM\) Chapter 3010](#), Significant and Reportable Occurrences
- 7.1.2 [DOE O 221.1B](#) Reporting Fraud, Waste and Abuse to the Office of Inspector General
- 7.1.3 [52.246-26 Reporting Nonconforming Items. | Acquisition.GOV](#) FAR – Federal Acquisition Regulation

7.0 TECHNICAL APPENDIX A – Identifying S/CI

Disclaimer

This appendix provides information on individual components identified as suspect/counterfeit items. Without additional information, the manufacturers or suppliers identified should not be considered as to have engaged in any wrongdoing. It is not necessarily a negative reflection on a supplier or manufacturer if their products are reported as S/CI. Reputable manufacturers and suppliers have a vital interest in preventing the manufacture and distribution of S/CI associated with their names. The company may have been victimized and is pursuing S/CI associated with its products in an aggressive, prudent, and professional manner to get these items off the market. Therefore, each particular case must be examined on its own merit without making premature conclusions about the fault or culpability of the manufacturer or supplier whose name is associated with the S/CI.

Items prone to be counterfeited:

- Moderate - or low-cost, high-demand/high turnover use items
- Items easily copied by secondary market suppliers
- Items that often bypass the vendor (seller or manufacturer) and are drop shipped to the requestor
- Items that are not typically inspected
- Items that are sold by un-authorized distributors

Typical Suspect/Counterfeit Items are:

- Used, rebuilt, or reconditioned items sold as new
- Fraudulently marked or labeled as being manufactured by a recognized reputable company, or certified by a regulatory or certifying agency
- Manufactured with misrepresented inferior materials, or processes that create a potential for failure and exposure to hazards.

Industrial types of items, materials, parts, and components that have been counterfeited include, but are not limited to:

- Hoists, as well as other hoisting, lifting, and rigging equipment
- Pumps, valves, pipe, pipe fittings, plates, couplings, plugs, spacers, nozzles, supports, hangars, and flanges
- Pre-formed metal, elastomers (O-rings, seals), spare replacement kits from suppliers other than the original equipment manufacturer, weld-filler material, diesel generator speed governors
- Fasteners: Metallic screw, nut, bolt, or stud having internal or external threads with a nominal diameter of 1/4 inch (6 mm) or greater. Washer that is through-hardened or represented as meeting a consensus standard that calls for through-hardening, and that is grade identification marked or represented as meeting a consensus standard that requires grade identification marking. e.g., J429 standard for automotive and related industries - below grade 5 (plus grade 8.1 studs) no grade-mark required. However, all bolts and screws shall bear the manufacturer identification symbol.
- Electrical equipment and devices, including circuit breakers, transformers, fuses, relays, resistors, capacitors, semiconductors, connectors, switch gear, power supplies, inverters, transmitters, and motors
- Metal plates, bars, shapes, channel members, and other structural items

- Welding rods and electrodes

The listing of commercial grade items that have been counterfeited is extensive. A partial listing is:

- Batteries: household, camera, and cell phone
- Extension cords
- Surge suppressors
- Fire extinguishers
- Automotive components, including oil filters and brake pads
- Computer components, semiconductors, software
- Pharmaceuticals

SUSPECT ITEM INDICATOR LIST

Note: This information alone does not constitute an item or material as being S/CI. Further research, such as a review of purchase orders, specifications, and certification / documentation is required before an item can be categorized as S/CI.

I. GENERAL INDICATORS

Visual Inspection

- Nameplates, labels, or tags have been altered, photocopied, or painted over; are not secured well; are unusual in location and method of attaching; have incomplete data; or are missing.
- Preprinted labels that show typed entries.
- Item has wear marks or scratches on external surfaces.
- Obvious attempts at repair or beautification have been made, such as excess painting or wire brushing; evidence of hand-painting (touch-up), painted stainless steel; non-ferrous metals (e.g., copper, brass, bronze) are clean and bright indicating recent polishing.
- Handmade parts are evident; gaskets are rough-cut; shims and thin metal part edges show evidence of cutting or dressing by hand tools (filing, hacksaw marks, tin snips, or nippers).
- Assembled items fit poorly.
- Metallic items are pitted or corroded.
- Heat discoloration marks.
- Casting markings have been ground off and the item has been re-stamped with other markings.
- Configuration is not consistent with other items from the same supplier or varies from that indicated in supplier literature or drawings.
- Inconsistency between vendor (seller/manufacturer) name on the item, and shipping container.
- Visual Inspection continued
- Nameplates attached with inconsistent fasteners, such as screws instead of rivets, or a combination of rivets and screws.
- Nameplates attached in a different location than normal.
- Warning labels with grammatical errors and conflicts with information found elsewhere on the packaging.
- Nameplates missing manufacturer's standard markings, stamps, or logos, and with irregular stamping or inconsistent type (font).
- Inconsistent appearances of items in the same shipment.
- Shipping boxes / totes containing mixed batch numbers, expiration dates, and uniform product codes (UPC).

- The item or component matches the description of one that is listed on a suspect item list (e.g., [DOE Suspect/Counterfeit Fastener Headmark List](#)).
- Unusual packaging and boxing of items. Packaging is inconsistent with the manufacturer's normal packaging or documentation requirements.
- Questionable or meaningless numbers on the item(s) or packaging.
- Signs of weld repairs
- Country of origin is China, Taiwan, India, Korea, or Mexico.
- Underwriters Laboratories (UL) marks missing one or more of the four elements (UL trademark, the word LISTED in capital letters, product identity, and a control number); a UL mark on the package – but not on the product.

Procurement

- Quoted price for the item is unusually discounted or low
- Unusual disclaimers, or denials, of responsibility for the accuracy of the test results, etc.
- The supplier is not a manufacturer's authorized distributor.
- Dimensions of the item are inconsistent with the specification requested on the purchase order, and those provided by the manufacturer at the time of the shipment.

There have been reports of counterfeiters raising prices to just below OEM levels in order to prevent such concerns.


II. DOCUMENTATION

Documentation may be suspect or fraudulent when:

- The use of correction fluid or correction tape is evident.
- Type style, size, or pitch change is evident.
- Documentation is not signed or initialed when required.
- It is excessively faded or unclear (indicating multiple, sequential copying), or data is missing.
- The name of the document approver, or title, cannot be determined; the document has missing or illegible signature, initials; the approvers name and signature does not match.
- Technical data is inconsistent with code or standard requirements.
- Certification or test results are identical between items when normal variations should be expected.
- Document is not traceable to the items procured.
- Corrections are not properly lined-out, initialed and dated.
- Documentation is not delivered as required on the purchase order or is in an unusual format.
- Lines on forms are bent, broken, or interrupted indicating data has been deleted or exchanged by "cut and paste".
- Handwritten entries are on the same document where there is typed or preprinted data.
- Text on page ends abruptly and the number of pages conflicts with the transmittal.
- Data on a single line is located at different heights.

8.0 TECHNICAL APPENDIX B - [S/CI Counterfeit Bolt Headmark List](#)

Suspect / Counterfeit Bolt Headmark List



ALL GRADE 5 AND GRADE 8 FASTENERS OF FOREIGN ORIGIN WHICH DO NOT BEAR ANY MANUFACTURERS' HEADMARKS



Grade 5



Grade 8

GRADE 5 FASTENERS WITH THE FOLLOWING MANUFACTURERS' HEADMARKS:



MARK

J

MANUFACTURER

Jinn Her (TW)



MARK

KS

MANUFACTURER

Kosaka Kogyo (JP)

GRADE 8 FASTENERS WITH THE FOLLOWING MANUFACTURERS' HEADMARKS:



MARK

A

MANUFACTURER

Asahi Mfg. (JP)



MARK

KS

MANUFACTURER

Kosaka Kogyo (JP)



NF

Nippon Fasteners (JP)



RT

Takai Ltd (JP)



H

Hinomoto Metal (JP)



FM

Fastener Co of Japan (JP)



M

Minamida Sieybo (JP)



KY

Kyoei Mfg (JP)



MS

Minato Kogyo (JP)



J

Jinn Her (TW)


 Hollow
Triangle

Infasco (CA TW JP YU) (Greater than 1/2 inch dia)



E

Daiei (JP)



UNY

Unytite (JP)

GRADE 8.2 FASTENERS WITH THE FOLLOWING HEADMARKS:




MARK

KS

MANUFACTURER

Kosaka Kogyo (JP)

GRADE A325 FASTENERS (BENNETT DENVER TARGET ONLY) WITH THE FOLLOWING HEADMARKS:




Type 1

MARK


 A325
KS

MANUFACTURER

A325 KS Kosaka Kogyo (JP)



Type 2



Type 3

Headmarkings are usually raised – sometimes indented.

KEY: CA-Canada, JP-Japan, TW-Taiwan, YU-Yugoslavia

ANY BOLT ON THIS LIST SHOULD BE TREATED AS DEFECTIVE WITHOUT FURTHER TESTING.

9.0 TECHNICAL APPENDIX C - S/CI Tags

FRONT S/CI Tag

HOLD	
S/CI Log #	
Reason:	
S/CI	
Print Name	
Signed	
Date	
Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory 1006.1001 Tag 1 S/CI Rev 000A6 100429	

2650-402500 TAG, S/CI, RIGID VINYL, CUSTOM, 3-1/2 IN. X 5-1/2 IN. X .015 IN., W/ HANGER WIRE ATTACHED, MFG. COLOR LOV-568 PURPLE, PACKAGE B1, 25 EA. PER PKG., PAMCO P/N MS-GW-MED ONLY -

BACK S/CI Tag

DISPOSITION	
Disposition	
<input type="checkbox"/> Replace	<input type="checkbox"/> Use As-Is
Other:	
S/CI	
Print Name	
Signed	
Date	
Review Date	
Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory	