
SHORT BASELINE NEUTRINO EXPERIMENT AREAS

SECTION IV CHAPTER 07 OF THE FERMILAB SAD

Revision 1 November 16, 2023

This Chapter of the Fermilab Safety Assessment Document (SAD) contains a summary of the results of the Safety Analysis for the SBN experiment areas of the Fermilab Main Accelerator that are pertinent to understanding the risks to the workers, the public, and the environment due to its operation.








SAD Chapter Review

This Section IV, Chapter 07 of the Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory (Fermilab) Safety Assessment Document (SAD), *Short Baseline Neutrino Experimental Areas*, was prepared and reviewed by the staff of the Particle Physics Directorate in conjunction with the Environment, Safety & Health Division (ESH) Accelerator Safety Department.

Signatures below indicate review of this Chapter, and recommendation that it be approved and incorporated into the Fermilab SAD.

Line Orga	anization Owner	- 🗆	Accelerator Safety Department Head
SAD Revi	iew Subcommittee Chair	- 🗆	







Revision History

Printed versions of this Chapter of the Fermilab Safety Assessment Document (SAD) may not be the currently approved revision. The current revision of this Chapter can be found on ESH DocDB #1066 along with all other current revisions of all Chapters of the Fermilab SAD.

Rev. No.	Date	Description of Change
1	November 16, 2023	 Rename from MicroBooNE to Short Baseline Neutrino Experimental Areas to align with current operations and organizational structure Update to align with updated SAD Layout Incorporation of Risk Matrix and hazard discussion Added presence of fluorinert in the SBND HV system, section 7.2.2.3 Modify section 7.2.10, Access & Egress, for the SBN-ND building to match recent updates to the building-specific training
0	June 23, 2014	Initial release of the MicroBooNE Detector chapter of the Fermilab Safety Assessment Document
	No.	No. 1 November 16, 2023








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


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Acronyms and Abbreviations

ACGIH American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists

ACNET Accelerator Control Network System

AD Accelerator Directorate

AHJ Authority Having Jurisdiction

ALARA As Low As Reasonably Achievable
ANSI American National Standards Institute

APS-TD Applied Physics and Superconducting Technology Directorate

ARA Airborne Radioactivity Area
ASE Accelerator Safety Envelope

ASHRAE American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air Conditioning

Engineers

ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers

ASO Accelerator Safety Order, referring to DOE O 420.2D Safety of

Accelerators

⁷Be Beryllium-7

BLM Beam Loss Monitor
BNB Booster Neutrino Beam
BPM Beam Position Monitor

BY Boneyard

CA Controlled Area
CA Contamination Area

CAS Contractor Assurance System

CC Credited Control

CCL Coupled Cavity Linac
CDC Critical Device Controller

CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research

CFM Cubic Feet per Minute

CFR Code of Federal Regulations (United States)

Ci Curie

CLW Co-Located Worker (the worker in the vicinity of the work but not

actively participating)

cm centimeter

CPB Cryogenics Plant Building

CSO Chief Safety Officer
CUB Central Utility Building
CW Continuous Wave

CX Categorically Excluded

D&D Decontamination and Decommissioning

DA Diagnostic Absorber

DAE Department of Atomic Energy India
DCS Derived Concentration Standard

DocDB Document Database





DOE Department of Energy

DOT Department of Transportation

DR Delivery Ring

DSO Division Safety Officer
DSS Division Safety Specialist

DTL Drift Tube Linac

DUNE Deep Underground Neutrino Experiment

EA Environmental Assessment

EA Exclusion Area
EAV Exhaust Air Vent

EENF Environmental Evaluation Notification Form

EMS Environmental Management System

EOC Emergency Operations Center
EPA Environmental Protection Agency
ES&H Environment, Safety and Health

Fermilab Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory, see also FNAL

FESHCom Fermilab ES&H Committee

FESHM Fermilab Environment, Safety and Health Manual

FHS Fire Hazard Subcommittee

FIRUS Fire Incident Reporting Utility System

FNAL Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory, see also Fermilab

FODO Focus-Defocus

FONSI Finding of No Significant Impact
FQAM Fermilab Quality Assurance Manual

FRA Fermi Research Alliance

FRCM Fermilab Radiological Control Manual

FSO Fermilab Site Office

FW Facility Worker (the worker actively performing the work)

GERT General Employee Radiation Training

GeV Giga-electron Volt

³H Tritium

HA Hazard Analysis

HAR Hazard Analysis Report
HCA High Contamination Area

HCTT Hazard Control Technology Team

HEP High Energy Physics

HFD Hold for Decay

HLCF High Level Calibration Facility

HPR Highly Protected Risk

Hr Hour

HRA High Radiation Area

HSSD High Sensitivity Air Sampling Detection
HVAC Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning





HWSF Hazardous Waste Storage Facility

Hz Hertz

IB Industrial Building

IBC International Building Code
ICW Industrial Cooling Water

IEPA Illinois Environmental Protection Agency

IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers

INFN Istituto Nazionale di Fisica Nucleare

IMPACT Integrated Management Planning and Control Tool

IPCBIllinois Pollution Control BoardIQAIntegrated Quality AssuranceISDInfrastructure Services DivisionISMIntegrated Safety Management

ITNA Individual Training Needs Assessment

KeV kilo-electron volt

kg kilo-grams kW kilo-watt

LBNF Long Baseline Neutrino Facility

LCW Low Conductivity Water LHC Large Hadron Collider

LLCF Low Level Calibration Facility

LLWCP Low Level Waste Certification Program

LLWHF Low Level Waste Handling Facility

LOTO Lockout/Tagout
LPM Laser Profile Monitor

LSND Liquid Scintillator Neutrino Detector

LSO Laser Safety Officer

m meter mA milli-amp

MABAS Mutual Aid Box Alarm System

MARS Monte Carlo Shielding Computer Code

MC Meson Center

MC&A Materials Control and Accountability

MCR Main Control Room

MEBT Medium Energy Beam Transport
MEI Maximally Exposed Individual

MeV Mega-electron volt

MI Main Injector

MINOS Main Injector Neutrino Oscillation Search

MMR Material Move Request

MOI Maximally-Exposed Offsite Individual (Note: due to the Fermilab Batavia Site

being open to the public, the location of the MOI is taken to be the location closest to the

accelerator that is accessible to members of the public.)

MP Meson Polarized





mrad milli-radian mrem milli-rem

mrem/hr milli-rem per hour

MT Meson Test

MTA 400 MeV Test Area
MTF Magnet Test Facility

²²Na Sodium-22NC Neutrino CenterNE Neutrino East

NEC National Electrical Code

NEPA National Environmental Policy Act

NESHAPS National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants

NFPA National Fire Protection Association

NM Neutrino Muon

NMR Nuclear Material Representative

NOvA Neutrino Off-axis Electron Neutrino (ve) Appearance

NPH Natural Phenomena Hazard

NRTL Nationally Recognized Testing Laboratory

NIF Neutron Irradiation Facility

NTSB Neutrino Target Service Building, see also TSB

NuMI Neutrinos at the Main Injector

NW Neutrino West

ODH Oxygen Deficiency Hazard

ORC Operational Readiness Clearance

OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration

pCi pico-Curie

pCi/mL pico-Curie per milliliter
PE Professional Engineer

PIN Personal Identification Number
PIP Proton Improvement Plan
PIP-II Proton Improvement Plan - II

PHAR Preliminary Hazards Analysis Report

PPD Particle Physics Directorate

PPE Personnel Protective Equipment

QA Quality Assurance

QAM Quality Assurance Manual

RA Radiation Area

RAF Radionuclide Analysis Facility

RAW Radioactive Water

RCT Radiological Control Technician

RF Radio-Frequency

RFQ Radio-Frequency Quadrupole

RIL RFQ Injector Line





RMA Radioactive Material Area

RMS Root Mean Square

RPCF Radiation Physics Calibration Facility

RPE Radiation Physics Engineering Department
RPO Radiation Physics Operations Department

RRM Repetition Rate Monitor RSI Reviewed Safety Issue

RSIS Radiation Safety Interlock System

RSO Radiation Safety Officer
RWP Radiological Work Permit
SA Shielding Assessment

SAA Satellite Accumulation Areas SAD Safety Assessment Document

SCF Standard Cubic Feet

SCFH Standard Cubic Feet per Hour

SEWS Site-Wide Emergency Warning System

SNS Spallation Neutron Source

SR Survey Riser

SRF Superconducting Radio-Frequency SRSO Senior Radiation Safety Officer SSB Switchyard Service Building

SSP Site Security Plan

SWIC Segmented Wire Ionization Chambers

TLM Total Loss Monitor
TLVs Threshold Limit Values
TPC Time Projection Chamber
TPES Target Pile Evaporator Stack

TPL Tagged Photon Lab

TSB Target Service Building, see also NTSB

TSCA Toxic Substances Control Act
TSW Technical Scope of Work
T&I Test and Instrumentation
UPB Utility Plant Building

UPS Uninterruptible Power Supply
USI Unreviewed Safety Issue
VCTF Vertical Cavity Test Facility
VHRA Very High Radiation Area


VMS Village Machine Shop

VMTF Vertical Magnet Test Facility

VTS Vertical Test Stand

WSHP Worker Safety and Health Program

μs micro-second







IV-7. Short Baseline Neutrino Experiment Areas

IV-7.1. Introduction

This Section IV, Chapter 7 of the Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory (Fermilab) Safety Assessment Document (SAD) covers the Short Baseline Neutrino (SBN) experiment areas of the Fermilab Main Accelerator. The SBN experiment areas are four buildings located on the path of neutrinos produced by the Booster Neutrino Beam (BNB), each holding a detector used by an experiment collaboration. From south to north these are: the Accelerator Neutrino Neutron Interaction Experiment (ANNIE) in the SciBooNE building; the Short Baseline Near Detector (SBND) in the Short Baseline Neutrino Near Detector building (SBN-ND); the MicroBooNE detector in the Liquid Argon Test Facility (LArTF); and the ICARUS detector in the Short Baseline Neutrino Far Detector building (SBN-FD). Each building has below-grade levels, approximately 30-ft below surface, so the detectors can be positioned on the centerline of the BNB. The SBN detectors are not accelerators, and the buildings sit physically separate from accelerator facilities.

IV-7.1.1 Purpose/Function

The purpose of the experiments in the SBN experiment areas is to measure properties of neutrinos, as part of the Lab's intensity frontier physics program. The experiments also contribute to the development of technology for future large-scale neutrino detectors. Three of the detectors – SBND, MicroBooNE, and ICARUS – are liquid argon time projection chamber (LArTPC) detectors. The LArTPC detector technology offers extraordinarily precise event reconstruction and particle identifications. The technology is being scaled to larger (>10 kiloton) detectors for the Deep Underground Neutrino Experiment (DUNE). ANNIE studies neutrons produced by neutrino-nucleus interactions in water using advanced photosensors; these studies inform the analysis of data from other detectors which are less efficient in neutron detection, such as LArTPCs. Although the design of each SBN detector is not identical to the DUNE detectors, the SBN detectors contribute to DUNE through development of technology and through development of techniques for reconstruction and analysis of complex neutrino interactions.

IV-7.1.2 Current Status

The SBN experiment areas segment of the Fermilab Main Accelerator is currently: operational.

IV-7.1.3 <u>Description</u>

The ANNIE detector consists of a water Cerenkov sub-detector coupled with a muon range sub-detector and a veto wall for rejection of background data. The water tank holds 26 tons of pure deionized water with a 0.2% concentration of gadolinium sulfate ($Gd_2O_{12}S_3$) in solution to enhance neutron detection. The muon range detector and veto wall use plastic scintillator. All the ANNIE sub-detectors employ photosensors to detect light from particles resulting from neutrino interactions with the detector materials.

The other three detectors in the SBN experiment areas are LArTPCs. These function by using liquified argon as both the target medium for the neutrinos and the detection medium for the particles resulting from the neutrino interactions. The particles from the interactions produce both light and ionization as they pass through the liquid argon, which is collected by photosensors and wire arrays. The LArTPC detectors are fully immersed in a liquid argon volume contained within cryostats, with attached cryogenics systems to maintain temperature stability and purity. All the cryostats have



plastic scintillator detectors mounted around their exteriors to detect incoming cosmic rays which are a background to the neutrino interactions.

The SBND experiment uses 260 tons of liquid argon contained in a membrane cryostat similar to those utilized for DUNE. The MicroBooNE detector holds 170 tons of liquid argon in a steel cylinder-shape cryostat. The ICARUS detector has a pair of rectangular aluminum-walled cryostats holding a total of 760 tons of liquid argon.

IV-7.1.4 Location

The SBN experiment areas of the Fermilab Main Accelerator are within the Fermilab site in Batavia, IL.




Figure 1. Regional view showing the location of the Fermilab site in Batavia, IL.

The SBN Experiment Areas are located on the west side of the Fermilab site, just north of the Main Accelerator.





Figure 2. Aerial view of the Fermilab site, indicating the location of the SBN Experiment Areas.

IV-7.1.5 <u>Management Organization</u>

The Neutrino Division within the Particle Physics Directorate is responsible for the commissioning, normal operations, and emergency management of the SBN Experiment Area facilities including the cryogenics systems. The experiments located in the SBN Experiment Areas are managed by their collaborations who oversee data collection and maintenance of the detectors and data collection systems.

IV-7.1.6 Operating Modes

The experiments in the SBN Experiment Area facilities operate their data collection systems 24/7 whenever the accelerator complex provides neutrinos from the BNB. The collaborations organize their personnel in shifts to monitor the operation of their detectors and data collection systems. The shifts can be performed from the Remote Operations Center (ROC)-West located in Wilson Hall on the Fermilab site or performed by connecting to experiment data collection systems from their home institutions. When the experiments are operating personnel are not required to be present in the SBN Experiment Areas buildings.

IV-7.1.7 Inventory of Hazards

The following table lists all the identified hazards found in the SBN Experiment Areas buildings. Section IV-7.9 *Appendix – Risk Matrices* describes the baseline risk (i.e., unmitigated risk), any preventative controls and/or mitigative controls in place to reduce the risk, and residual risk (i.e., mitigated risk) for facility worker, co-located worker and Maximally Exposed Offsite Individual (MOI) (i.e., members of the public). A summary of these reductions and mitigations is described within Section IV-7.2 *Safety Assessment*.

Accelerator specific hazards are identified as **purple/bold** in Table 1; there are no accelerator-specific hazards in the SBN experiment areas. All hazards present in the SBN Experiment Areas are safely managed by DOE approved applicable safety and health programs and/or processes, and their



analyses have been performed according to applicable DOE requirements as flowed down through the Fermilab Environment, Safety and Health Manual (FESHM), as described in Section I Chapter 4. These hazards are considered to be Non-Accelerator-Specific Hazards (NASH), and their specific instances in the SBN areas are summarized in this SAD Chapter.

Table 1. Hazard Inventory for SBN Experiment Areas.

	Radiological	Toxic Materials					
	Prompt Ionizing Radiation		Lead				
	Residual Activation		Beryllium				
	Groundwater Activation	\boxtimes	Flourinert & Its Byproducts				
	Surface Water Activation		Liquid Scintillator Oil				
	Radioactive Water (RAW) Systems		Pseudocumene				
	Air Activation		Ammonia				
	Closed Loop Air Cooling		Nanoparticle Exposures				
	Soil Interactions		Flammables and Combustibles				
	Radioactive Waste	\boxtimes	Combustible Materials (e.g., cables, wood cribbing, etc.)				
	Contamination		Flammable Materials (e.g., flammable gas, cleaning materials, etc.)				
	Beryllium-7		Electrical Energy				
	Radioactive Sources		Stored Energy Exposure				
	Nuclear Material	\boxtimes	High Voltage Exposure				
	Radiation Generating Devices (RGDs)	\boxtimes	Low Voltage, High Current Exposure				
\boxtimes	Non-Ionizing Radiation Hazards	Kinetic Energy					
	Thermal Energy	\boxtimes	Power Tools				
	Bakeouts	\boxtimes	Pumps and Motors				
	Hot Work		Motion Tables				
\boxtimes	Cryogenics		Mobile Shielding				
	Potential Energy		Magnetic Fields				
\boxtimes	Crane Operations		Fringe Fields				
	Compressed Gasses		Other Hazards				
\boxtimes	Vacuum/Pressure Vessels/Piping	\boxtimes	Confined Spaces				
\boxtimes	Vacuum Pumps		Noise				
\boxtimes	Material Handling		Silica				
	Access & Egress		Ergonomics				
\boxtimes	Life Safety Egress		Asbestos				
		\boxtimes	Working at Heights				

IV-7.2. Safety Assessment

All hazards for the SBN Experiment Areas segment of the Fermilab Main Accelerator are summarized in this section. All are non-accelerator specific hazards (NASH); lab-wide common mitigations to these hazards are described in Section 1 Chapter 4.

IV-7.2.1 Radiological Hazards

The SBN Experiment Areas present radiological hazards in the form of non-ionizing radiation from lasers.

IV-7.2.1.1 Prompt Ionizing Radiation

N/A.

IV-7.2.1.2 Residual Activation

N/A; neutrino interactions with materials does not result in activation of the materials.



IV-7.2.1.3 Groundwater Activation

N/A; neutrino interactions with materials does not result in activation of the materials.

IV-7.2.1.4 Surface Water Activation

N/A.

IV-7.2.1.5 Radioactive Water (RAW) Systems

N/A.

IV-7.2.1.6 Air Activation

N/A; neutrino interactions with materials does not result in activation of the materials.

IV-7.2.1.7 Closed Loop Air Cooling

N/A.

IV-7.2.1.8 Soil Interactions

N/A; neutrino interactions with materials does not result in activation of the materials.

IV-7.2.1.9 Radioactive Waste

N/A; neutrino interactions with materials does not result in activation of the materials.

IV-7.2.1.10 Contamination

N/A.

IV-7.2.1.11 Beryllium-7

N/A.

IV-7.2.1.12 Radioactive Sources

N/A.

IV-7.2.1.13 Nuclear Material

N/A.

IV-7.2.1.14 Radiation Generating Devices (RGDs)

N/A.

IV-7.2.1.15 Non-lonizing Radiation Hazards

Class 4 and Class 3R lasers are utilized by the SBN experiment area detectors. Class 4 lasers present an unmitigated risk of I which is reduced by controls to a residual risk of IV, as described in the tables in Section I Chapter 4. Class 3R lasers present a Baseline Risk at acceptable level and no further analysis or controls are needed.

Class 4 UV lasers are installed in the MicroBooNE and SBND experiments for calibration of the LArTPC detectors; they are operated infrequently. Each laser and light path is fully enclosed and locked, with safety signage posted on the enclosure when the laser calibration system is in operation. The laser



light paths are entirely below grade, with no possible line-of-sight to above-grade locations either inside or outside the building. The collaborators who operate or service the lasers (SMEs) undergo laser safety training and a laser eye exam. Each laser system has a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for the system experts.

Class 3R laser systems are installed in the ANNIE and ICARUS experiments for calibration of their photodetectors. Both systems are located below grade, with light paths entirely contained below grade interior to the buildings. Both systems are operated on a regular periodic basis by their collaborations. The ANNIE calibration system can be operated remotely. The ICARUS calibration system is operated by its experts by accessing the equipment in the SBN-FD building.

All laser installations have been reviewed and approved by the Fermilab Laser Safety Officer (LSO) prior to operation, and meet all requirements found in Fermilab Environment, Safety and Health Manual (FESHM) Chapter *Lasers*, as stated in Section I Chapter 4.

IV-7.2.2 Toxic Materials

The gadolinium sulfate (0.2% solution) which is used by the ANNIE experiment has no occupational exposure limit as evidenced by the SDS. PPE recommendations for safe handling are specified in the material SDS and consist of gloves and safety goggles utilized during any filling/removal operation.

IV-7.2.2.1 Lead

N/A.

IV-7.2.2.2 Beryllium

N/A.

IV-7.2.2.3 Fluorinert & Its Byproducts

Fluorinert is present in the SBN-ND building as a part of the LArTPC detector high voltage sub-system. The high voltage system utilizes electrical filtering of the applied voltage. The electrical filter is contained in a cylindrical vessel, approximately 75 cm length and 20 cm diameter. There are two volumes within a filter vessel which serve to contain two types of dielectric fluid. The larger volume, which holds the main filtering resistor components, contains dielectric oil like that used in transformers. The smaller volume, where the HV cable enters and exits a filter vessel, contains fluorinert. There are two of these filter vessels connected along the length of the HV cable, one where the cable exits the HV PS at ground level north of the detector, and the other where the cable connects to the HV Feed-through, on the top of the detector below-grade at the Mezzanine level. The total volume of fluorinert present in these two filter vessels is approximately 0.6 liter and is contained in a closed system. An acceptable risk level from this hazard is assessed in Section I Chapter 4.

IV-7.2.2.4 Liquid Scintillator Oil

N/A.

IV-7.2.2.5 Pseudocumene

N/A.

IV-7.2.2.6 Ammonia

N/A.



IV-7.2.2.7 Nanoparticle Exposures

N/A.

IV-7.2.3 Flammables and Combustibles

The instances of this hazard in the SBN Experiment Areas have been evaluated within the common Risk Matrix table included in SAD Section I Chapter 4 Safety analysis. An unmitigated risk of I is reduced to a residual risk of IV with use of the listed controls. No further or unique controls are utilized in the SBN areas.

IV-7.2.3.1 Combustible Materials

The SBN Experiment buildings utilize the controls described in the tables in Section I Chapter 4.

IV-7.2.3.2 Flammable Materials

N/A; very small volumes (less than 1 liter) of some flammable cleaning materials (e.g. acetone) are stored in fire-proof cabinets at SBN-ND and SBN-FD.

IV-7.2.4 <u>Electrical Energy</u>

All the buildings in the SBN Experiment Areas contain standard electrical power distribution systems. There are no exposed conductors. The experiment detectors in each building utilize both commercial and custom-made equipment for data-taking including DC power supplies. All experiment equipment is reviewed prior to use following the Operational Readiness Clearance process to ensure compliance with electrical safety standards as listed in Section 1 Chapter 4.

IV-7.2.4.1 Stored Energy Exposure

N/A.

IV-7.2.4.2 High Voltage Exposure

The instances of this hazard in the SBN Experiment Areas are evaluated within the common Risk Matrix table included in SAD Section I Chapter 4 Safety analysis. High voltage electrical installations implement the controls specified in the common Risk Matrix table, which reduce an unmitigated risk of I to a residual risk of IV. No additional or unique controls are applied.

IV-7.2.4.3 Low Voltage, High Current Exposure

The instances of this hazard in the SBN Experiment Areas are evaluated within the common Risk Matrix table included in SAD Section I Chapter 4 Safety analysis. Low voltage, high current electrical installations implement the controls specified in the common Risk Matrix table, which reduce an unmitigated risk of I to a residual risk of IV. No additional or unique controls are applied.

IV-7.2.5 Thermal Energy

Cryogenic liquids are present in closed cryogenics systems.

IV-7.2.5.1 Bakeouts

N/A.

IV-7.2.5.2 Hot Work



N/A.

IV-7.2.5.3 Cryogenics

Cryogenic liquids - liquid argon and liquid nitrogen - are present in three of the SBN experiment areas buildings: SBN-ND, LArTF, and SBN-FD. Hazards from these cryogens include the potential for oxygendeficient (ODH) atmospheres due to catastrophic failure of the cryostat vessel or cryogenic systems, and thermal (cold burn) hazards from cryogenic components and pressure hazards. An oxygendeficient atmosphere could result from cryogenic systems failure/rupture of the vessel or piping, insulation failure, mechanical damage/failure, deficient maintenance, or improper procedures.

These hazards are evaluated within the common Risk Matrix table included in SAD Section I Chapter 4 Safety analysis. The cryogenics installations implement the controls specified in the common Risk Matrix table, which reduce an unmitigated risk of I to a residual risk of IV.

Liquid argon is a primary functional component of the SBND, MicroBooNE and ICARUS experiment detectors. Each of their cryogenics systems consists of the detector cryostat(s), liquid nitrogen and liquid argon storage and distribution tanks, pumps, filter systems, piping, and associated appurtenances. The cryogenics systems circulate and purify large volumes of liquid argon held in cryostats which the experiment detectors are submerged in. Liquid nitrogen is utilized by the cryogenics systems to condense argon boiling off the liquid surface inside the cryostats, a process which helps maintain temperature and pressure control of the cryostat interiors.

At SBN-ND, there is an 8,000-gallon liquid argon dewar and a 9,000-gallon liquid nitrogen dewar located outside the building. Inside, within the below-grade pit area, the SBND cryostat contains approximately 51,000 gallons of liquid argon.

At LArTF there is a 500-gallon liquid argon dewar, an 11,000-gallon liquid nitrogen dewar and an 11,000-gallon liquid argon buffer tank located outside the building. The MicroBooNE cryostat, located in the below-grade pit, contains approximately 32,000 gallons of liquid argon. Note, the MicroBooNE cryostat is being emptied by way of slow boil-off; the process is expected to complete by end of calendar 2023.

At SBN-FD, there is an 8,000-gallon liquid argon dewar and a 20,000-gallon liquid nitrogen dewar located outside the building. The two ICARUS detector cryostats, located in the below-grade pit, each contain approximately 73,000 gallons of liquid argon.

The cryogenic systems are designed and installed to comply with applicable standards per FESHM Chapters *Pressure Vessels*, *Piping Systems*, *Inert Gas Trailer Connections and Onsite Filling Guidelines*, *Gas Regulators*, *Inspection and Testing of Relief Systems*, *Cryogenic System Review*, *Liquid Nitrogen Dewar Installation and Operation Rules*, and *Liquid Cryogenic Targets*, as stated in Section 1 Chapter 4.1.5.3.

Portions of the distribution piping within the cryogenic systems present the potential for thermal burns; these have been marked and insulation applied to protect workers and users from inadvertent contact.

The presence of cryogenic systems in the SBN experiment areas requires analysis and calculation to determine the ODH class, as described in Section 1 Chapter 4.2.2.2. The buildings containing cryogenic systems - SBN-ND, LarTF, and SBN-FD - are all classified ODH-0 on the ground level and classified ODH-1 on the below-grade levels. All three buildings have ODH safety systems for monitoring of ODH hazards and broadcasting alarms when ODH conditions are detected, as described in Section 1



Chapter 4.3.2.2. The SBN Experiment areas hazard controls include ODH warning signals, oxygen sensors (interlocked with the Fermilab's Fire Incident Reporting and Utility System (FIRUS) alarm), and ventilation fans. The cryogenics controls systems utilize a parallel method of monitoring which reports alarms to the Neutrino Division engineering group and to collaboration personnel monitoring their detectors.

Each SBN building which holds cryogenics has an emergency generator which engages automatically in a power outage. The generators at each building provide power for critical life-safety systems - cryogenics controls, ODH alarms, ventilation of egress paths - maintaining ODH monitoring and safe exit from an ODH incident during power outages.

IV-7.2.6 Kinetic Energy

The SBN Experiment areas all have sump pump systems. SBN-ND and SBN-FD have air compressors supplying pneumatic valves in the cryogenics systems. Powered hand tools are occasionally used during experiment maintenance periods. There are no machine shop tools in the SBN buildings.

IV-7.2.6.1 Power Tools

The hazards from powered hand tools are evaluated within the common Risk Matrix table included in SAD Section I Chapter 4 Safety analysis. Usage of powered hand tools implement the controls specified in the common Risk Matrix table., which reduce an unmitigated risk of I to a residual risk of IV. No additional or unique controls are applied.

IV-7.2.6.2 Pumps and Motors

The hazards from pumps and motors are evaluated within the common Risk Matrix table included in SAD Section I Chapter 4 Safety analysis. Work performed on and with pumps and motors implement the controls specified in the common Risk Matrix table., which reduce an unmitigated risk of I to a residual risk of III. No additional or unique controls are applied.

IV-7.2.6.3 Motion Tables

N/A.

IV-7.2.6.4 Mobile Shielding

N/A.

IV-7.2.7 <u>Potential Energy</u>

Overhead cranes are found within the SBN-ND, LArTF, and SBN-FD buildings. A mobile crane must be utilized for moving heavy equipment in/out of the SciBooNE building.

Compressed gases can be present at all the SBN buildings.

The cryostats and cryogenics systems at SBN-ND, LArTF, and SBN-FD utilize vacuum and pressure vessels, and vacuum/pressure piping; all are designed, installed, reviewed, and approved following FESHM. The ANNIE experiment water tank is not a pressure vessel. Vacuum pumps are found in SBN-ND and SBN-FD.

Materials handling occurs as needed at all the SBN Experiment Areas.

IV-7.2.7.1 Crane Operations



The hazards in crane operations are evaluated within the common Risk Matrix table included in SAD Section I Chapter 4 Safety analysis. Work involving crane operations implements the controls specified in the common Risk Matrix table, which reduce an unmitigated risk of I to a residual risk of IV. No additional or unique controls are applied.

IV-7.2.7.2 Compressed Gasses

A non-flammable argon/hydrogen gas mixture (2.5% hydrogen, balance argon) is used for regeneration of the argon filtering systems at SBN-ND and SBN-FD. This gas mixture is supplied by a tube trailer located outside of the building. The tube trailer conforms to ASME and DOT standards per FESHM chapters *Pressure Piping Systems*, *Inert Gas Trailer Connections and Onsite Filling Guidelines*, and *Retesting Procedures for DOT Gas Storage Cylinders Including Tube Trailers*. Personnel utilizing the gas trailer have completed Compressed Gas Cylinder Safety training. The mixture does not pose unique hazards. Note – the tube trailer serving SBN-ND is moved from LArTF circa summer 2023.

Standard compressed gas bottles may be present at any of the buildings for incidental work; gas bottle racks are available for storage at all SBN buildings. The hazards in the use of compressed gas in bottles are evaluated within the common Risk Matrix table included in SAD Section I Chapter 4 Safety analysis. Work involving compressed gas bottles implements the controls specified in the common Risk Matrix table, which reduce an unmitigated risk of I to a residual risk of IV. No additional or unique controls are applied.

IV-7.2.7.3 Vacuum/Pressure Vessels/Piping

The hazards due to the presence of vacuum/pressure vessels/piping operations are evaluated within the common Risk Matrix table included in SAD Section I Chapter 4 Safety analysis. Work involving vacuum/pressure vessels/piping implements the controls specified in the common Risk Matrix table, which reduce an unmitigated risk of I to a residual risk of IV. No additional or unique controls are applied.

IV-7.2.7.4 Vacuum Pumps

The hazards due to the presence of vacuum pumps are evaluated within the common Risk Matrix table included in SAD Section I Chapter 4 Safety analysis. Work involving vacuum pumps implements the controls specified in the common Risk Matrix table, which reduce an unmitigated risk of I to a residual risk of III. No additional or unique controls are applied.

IV-7.2.7.5 Material Handling

The hazards due to material handling operations are evaluated within the common Risk Matrix table included in SAD Section I Chapter 4 Safety analysis. Materials handling work implements the controls specified in the common Risk Matrix table, which reduce an unmitigated risk of I to a residual risk of III. No additional or unique controls are applied.

IV-7.2.8 <u>Magnetic Fields</u>

N/A.

IV-7.2.8.1 Fringe Fields

N/A.

IV-7.2.9 Other Hazards



N/A.

IV-7.2.9.1 Confined Spaces

Confined spaces exist in the SBN Experiment areas. These are: in SciBooNE the lower level surrounding the detectors; in SBN-ND the interior of the cryostat during the installation period before the cryostat top is welded; in LArTF the platform catwalk; in SBN-FD the pipe chase between lower levels and ground level. In all the SBN Experiment areas buildings, the sump pump pits are also confined spaces.

Each of these confined spaces is included on the laboratory's confined space inventory, and require permits for entry, following FESHM Chapter *Confined Spaces*. The hazards in entering these confined spaces are evaluated within the common Risk Matrix table included in SAD Section I Chapter 4 Safety analysis. Entry into the confined spaces implements the controls specified in the common Risk Matrix table, which reduce an unmitigated risk of I to a residual risk of III. No additional or unique controls are applied.

IV-7.2.9.2 Noise

N/A.

IV-7.2.9.3 Silica

N/A.

IV-7.2.9.4 Ergonomics

N/A.

IV-7.2.9.5 Asbestos

N/A.

IV-7.2.9.6 Working at Heights

Working at heights is periodically necessary in the SBN Experiment areas. These instances are evaluated within the common Risk Matrix table included in SAD Section I Chapter 4 Safety analysis. All work at heights implements the controls specified in the common Risk Matrix table, which reduce an unmitigated risk of I to a residual risk of III. No additional or unique controls are applied.

IV-7.2.10 Access & Egress

Access to all the SBN Experimental Areas requires completion of building-specific hazard awareness training courses. Once completed the individual's ID provides entry using via ID card reader into SBN-ND, LarTF, and SBN-FD; an ordinary door key can also be issued to trained personnel. Entry to SciBooNE is only via a key.

When cryogens are present in SBN-ND, LArTF, and SBN-FD then completion of ODH training and medical qualifications is required for entry to ODH-1 classified spaces. These three buildings are classified ODH-0 on their ground levels, allowing normal access to these spaces, and are classified ODH-1 in the below-grade levels. Access to the below-grade mezzanine and pit areas in SBN-ND is via gates at the top of the mezzanine stairs and at the top of the ship-ladder to the pit; ID card access for personnel with ODH training is planned to be installed at the mezzanine gate in 2024. Access to the stairwells and lower levels of LArTF is controlled via a key-tree interlock system; only personnel who have current ODH training are given access codes to the key-tree. Gates at the below-



grade stairwell landings in SBN-FD provide ID card access only for personnel with current ODH training; keys to the gates are available for emergency access.

Each SBN building which holds cryogenics has an emergency generator which engages automatically in a power outage. The generators at each building provide power for critical life-safety systems - cryogenics controls, ODH alarms, ventilation of egress paths - maintaining ODH monitoring and safe exit from an ODH incident during power outages.

In all SBN Experiment Areas buildings, two-person work rules are in effect for any work performed in the ODH-1 classified areas, and for SciBooNE any work below grade.

IV-7.2.10.1 Life Safety Egress

Life safety egress in all SBN Experiment Areas buildings is evaluated within the common Risk Matrix table included in SAD Section I Chapter 4 Safety analysis. Egress design and maintenance implements the controls specified in the common Risk Matrix table, which reduces an unmitigated risk of I to a residual risk of IV.

All the SBN Experiment Areas buildings have multiple exits at ground level, except SciBoone which has only one entrance/exit for the enclosure. SBN-ND has one stairway path from below grade to ground level. Both LArTF and SBN-FD have two stairway paths from below grade to ground level. SBN-ND and LArTF have 4 exit doors at ground level. SBN-FD has 7 exit doors at ground level. Exit through any of the doors controlling entrance to ODH-1 areas does not require key or card reader.

At SBN-FD the designated tornado shelter is the ODH-0 classified below-grade stairwell landing. At LArTF the designated tornado shelter is the nearby MiniBooNE enclosure; a key for emergency entry is located next to the key tree in LArTF. The designated tornado shelter for both SBN-ND and SciBooNE is MI-10; a key for emergency entry to MI-10 is available in SBN-ND. MI-10 is approximately 100 yards from SciBooNE and SBN-ND.

Occupancy at the SBN Experiment Areas buildings during operations is low, generally less than 5 persons. Operation of the experiments does not require personnel to be present in the buildings; monitoring of the experiment and data-taking equipment is performed from remote locations both on and off the Laboratory site. Alarm systems on both the data-taking systems and cryogenics systems alert personnel to deviations from normal status. During installation and commissioning phases the occupancy level of any area can increase but seldom to more than 20 persons. As of autumn 2023, the SBND experiment is completing installation, ICARUS is operating, and MicroBooNE is in the process of decommissioning.

IV-7.2.11 Environmental

No area-specific hazards; see Section I Chapter 4.

IV-7.2.11.1 Hazard to Air

No area-specific hazards; see Section I Chapter 4.

IV-7.2.11.2 Hazard to Water

No area-specific hazards; see Section I Chapter 4.

IV-7.2.11.3 Hazard to Soil

No area-specific hazards; see Section I Chapter 4.



IV-7.3. Summary of Hazards to Members of the Public

No area-specific hazards to the general public; see Section I Chapter 4.

IV-7.4. Summary of Credited Controls

There are no area-specific credited controls.

IV-7.5. Defense-in-Depth Controls

IV-7.5.1 Administrative Controls

Administrative procedures have been put in place to ensure safe operations at the SBN Detector sites.

IV-7.5.1.1 Operation Authorization Document

Operational readiness clearance (ORC) of the experiments is governed by FESHM Chapter 2005 *Operational Readiness Clearance*. Subject matter experts review each aspect of the experiment prior to operations to ensure safe operations. The review includes procedure, hazard analysis and document reviews and walk-throughs of the experiment components. Division head(s) of the area(s) in which experiment components reside grant approval for operations.

IV-7.6. Decommissioning

The SBN buildings may be utilized for future experiments. Decommissioning of the currently operating SBN experiments will follow the requirements of FESHM Chapter 7050, *Rules for Demolition* and FESHM Chapter 8070, *Decontamination and Decommissioning*. DOE Field Element Manager approval shall be obtained prior to the start of any decommissioning activities for the SBN Experiment Areas.

IV-7.7. Summary and Conclusion

This chapter of the Fermilab SAD identifies and assesses specific hazards associated with commissioning and operation of the SBN Experiment Areas. The chapter identifies and describes designs, controls, and procedures to mitigate specific hazards for the ANNIE, SBND, MicroBooNE, and ICARUS experiment detectors. In addition to the specific safety considerations presented in this chapter, the ANNIE, SBND, MicroBooNE, and ICARUS experiments are subject to the global and more general safety requirements, controls, and procedures outlined in Section I of this Fermilab SAD.

The SBN experiments have been/will be constructed, commissioned, and operated within the specific and general considerations of this safety assessment. The preceding discussion of the hazards and their mitigations presented by the SBN Experiment Area operations demonstrate that the experiments can be operated in a manner that will produce minimal hazards to the health and safety of Fermilab workers, researchers, members of the public, as well as to the environment.

IV-7.8. References

- [1] Fermilab Radiological Control Manual
- [2] MicroBooNE Ground Floor ODH Analysis The current link is: http://microboone-docdb.fnal.gov:8080/cgi-bin/ShowDocument?docid=2346
- [3] MicroBooNE Hazard Analysis The current link is: http://microboone-docdb.fnal.gov:8080/cgi-bin/ShowDocument?docid=1612



- [4] MicroBooNE ODH Analysis The current link is: http://microboone-docdb.fnal.gov:8080/cgi-bin/ShowDocument?docid=2322
- [5] SBN Hazard Analysis The current link is: https://sbn-docdb.fnal.gov/cgibin/cert/ShowDocument?docid=1518
- [6] SBN-FD ODH Analysis EN02219
- [7] SBN-ND ODH Analysis EN02218

IV-7.9. Appendix – Risk Matrices

Risk Assessment methodology was developed based on the methodology described in DOE-HDBK-1163-2020. Hazards and their potential events are evaluated for likelihood and potential consequence assuming no controls in place, which results in a baseline risk. A baseline risk (i.e., an unmitigated risk) value of III and IV does not require further controls based on the Handbook. Events with a baseline risk value of I or II do require prevention and/or mitigation measures to be established in order to reduce the risk value to an acceptable level of III or IV. Generally, preventive controls are applied prior to a loss event, reflecting a likelihood reduction, and mitigative controls are applied after a loss event, reflecting a consequence reduction. For each control put in place, likelihood or consequence can have a single "bin drop", resulting in a new residual risk (i.e., a mitigated risk). This risk assessment process is repeated for each hazard for Facility Workers (FW), Co-Located Workers (CLW), and Maximally-Exposed Offsite Individual (MOI). At the conclusion of the risk assessments, controls that are in place for the identified accelerator specific hazards are identified as Credited Controls and further summarized in Section IV-7.4



Table 11. Summary of Baseline and Residual Risks – SBN Experiment Areas

	Risk Tables Description	Baseline Risk	Residual Risk
11.1	Radiological – Onsite-1 Facility Worker	R:I/III	R:IV/III
11.2	Radiological – Onsite-2 Co-located Worker	R:I/III	R:IV/III
11.3	Radiological – MOI Offsite	R:N/A	R:N/A
11.4	Flammable & Combustible Materials – Onsite-1 Facility Worker *	R:*	R:*
11.5	Flammable & Combustible Materials – Onsite-2 Co-located worker *	R:*	R:*
11.6	Flammable & Combustible Materials – MOI Offsite *	R:*	R:*
11.7	Electrical Energy – Onsite-1 Facility Worker	R:*	R:*
11.8	Electrical Energy – Onsite-2 Co-located Worker	R:*	R:*
11.9	Electrical Energy – MOI Offsite	R:*	R:*
11.10	Thermal Energy – Onsite-1 Facility Worker	R:*	R:*
11.11	Thermal Energy – Onsite-2 Co-located Worker	R:*	R:*
11.12	Thermal Energy – MOI Offsite	R:*	R:*
11.13	Kinetic Energy – Onsite-1 Facility Worker	R:*	R:*
11.14	Kinetic Energy – Onsite-2 Co-located Worker	R:*	R:*
11.15	Kinetic Energy – MOI Offsite	R:*	R:*
11.16	Potential Energy- Onsite-1 Facility Worker	R:*	R:*
11.17	Potential Energy – Onsite-2 Co-located Worker	R:*	R:*
11.18	Potential Energy – MOI Offsite	R:*	R:*
11.19	Other Hazards – Onsite-1 Facility Worker	R:*	R:*
11.20	Other Hazards – Onsite-2 Co-located Worker	R:*	R:*
11.21	Other Hazards – MOI Offsite	R:*	R:*
11.22	Access & Egress – Onsite-1 Facility Worker	R:*	R:*
11.23	Access & Egress – Onsite-2 Co-located Worker	R:*	R:*
11.24	Access & Egress – MOI Offsite	R:*	R:*
11.25	Environmental Hazards	R:*	R:*

^{*}This hazard has been evaluated within the common Risk Matrix table included in SAD Section I Chapter 04 Safety Analysis. Work in the specified areas involving this hazard implements the controls specified in the common Risk Matrix table. No unique controls are in use.

NOTE:

Per DOE-HDBK-1163-2020, Appendix C, "Risk Assessment Methodology":

"Events with an unmitigated risk values of III or IV would not require additional control assignments to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection. Whereas, for events with an unmitigated risk value of I or II, controls would need to be assigned to either reduce the likelihood or the consequence, and therefore the overall mitigated risk. Generally, preventive controls are applied prior to a loss event – reflecting a likelihood reduction and mitigative controls are applied after a loss event – reflecting a consequence reduction. Each control is credited for a single "bin drop" either in likelihood or consequence; not both. Following a standard hierarchy of controls, controls are applied until the residual risk is acceptable – reflecting a mitigated risk value of III or IV. After controls are credited, events with a remaining unacceptable residual risk (i.e., I or II) are candidates for additional analyses and additional controls, often quantitative in nature." For Fermilab, these controls for accelerator-specific hazards are identified as Credited Controls and further summarized in the Accelerator Safety Envelope (ASE).

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Table 11.1 Radiological – Onsite-1 Facility Worker

Hazard	Hazard Description	Baseline Qualitative Risk (without controls)	Preventative (P)/ Mitigative (M)	Residual Qualitative Risk (with controls)
Non-ionizing	Hazard: Exposure to Class 4 lasers	L: A	P: Class 1 (light tight) enclosures	L: BEU
Radiation	Class A LIVI I and CMC and Dan NIE	C: H	P: ORC and work planning processes	C: M
Hazards Lasers*	Class 4 UV lasers (MicroBooNE	R: I	P: Locked/Interlocked system	R: IV
	and SBND)		P: LOTO procedure or other procedure approved by the LSO	
			P: Affected areas are posted	
			M: Use of PPE	
	Hazard: Exposure to Class 3R laser			
	• Class 3R laser (ICARUS & ANNIE)	L: A	No analysis required	L: A
		C: L		C: L
		R:III		R: III

*NON-Ionizing Radiation follows rule for "Other Hazard Consequences," derived from Figure C-1, "Example Qualitative Consequence Matrix", DOE-HDBK-1163-2020.												
Likelihood (L, of event)/year	Co	onsequence (C, of event)/y	year Risk (R, Qualitative	Risk (R, Qualitative Ranking)			ix	X				
$\mathbf{A} = \text{Anticipated } (L > 1.0E-02)$		$\mathbf{H} = \mathbf{High}$	I = situation (eve	ent) of major concern			Likelihood					
U = Unlikely (1.0E-02> L > 1.0E-04)		$\mathbf{M} = \mathbf{Moderate}$	$\mathbf{II} = \text{situation (ev}$	ent) of concern			Α	U	EU	BEU		
EU = Extremely Unlikely (1.0E-04 > L > 1.0E-06)		L = Low	III = situation (e	vent) of minor concern	83	Н	I	I	II	III		
BEU = Beyond Extremely Unlikely $(1.0E-06>L)$		N = Negligible	IV = situation (e	vent) of minimal concern	l c	М	TT	II	III	IV		
Control(s) Type	C	Offsite (MOI)	Onsite-2 (co-located worker)	Onsite-1 (facility worker)	anb	IVI	11	11	111	1 V		
 P = Preventive (reduce event occurrence likelihood) M = Mitigative (reduces event consequences) 	Н	C ≥ Irreversible,	C ≥ Prompt worker fatality	C ≥ Prompt worker	ouse	L	III	III	IV	IV		
Acronyms		other serious effects,	or acute injury that is	fatality or acute injury that	၁	N	IV	IV	IV	IV		
MOI = Maximally-exposed Offsite Individual		or symptoms which	immediately life-	is immediately life-								
		•	threatening or permanently	threatening or								
		individual's ability to	disabling.	permanently disabling.								
		take protective										
	N. #	action.		a. a								
	M	$C \ge Mild$, transient	$C \ge Serious injury, no$	$C \ge Serious injury, no$								
		adverse effects.	immediate loss of life no	immediate loss of life no								
			permanent disabilities;	permanent disabilities;								
			hospitalization required.	hospitalization required.								



L	,	Mild, transient	Minor injuries; no	Minor injuries; no
		adverse effects > C	hospitalization > C	hospitalization > C
$\overline{\mathbf{N}}$	I	Consequences less	Consequences less than	Consequences less than
		than those for Low	those for Low Consequence	those for Low
		Consequence Level	Level	Consequence Level



Table 11.2 Radiological – Onsite-2 Co-located Worker

Hazard	Hazard Description	Baseline Qualitative Risk (without controls)	Preventative (P)/ Mitigative (M)	Residual Qualitative Risk (with controls)
Non-ionizing	Hazard: Exposure to Class 4 lasers	L: A	P: Class 1 (light tight) enclosures	L: BEU
Radiation		C: H	P: ORC and work planning processes	C: M
Hazards Lasers*	• Class 4 UV lasers (MicroBooNE	R: I	P: Locked/Interlocked system	R: IV
	and SBND)		P: LOTO procedure or other procedure approved by the LSO	
			P: Affected areas are posted	
			M: Use of PPE	
	Hazard: Exposure to Class 3R laser			
	• Class 3R laser (ICARUS &	L: A	No analysis required	L: A
	ANNIE)	C: L		C: L
		R:III		R: III

*NON-Ionizing Radiation follows rule for "Other Hazard Consequences," derived from Figure C-1, "Example Qualitative Consequence Matrix", DOE-HDBK-1163-2020.											
Likelihood (L, of event)/year	C	onsequence (C, of event)/y	vear Risk (R, Qualitative	Risk (R, Qualitative Ranking)			x				
$\mathbf{A} = \text{Anticipated } (L > 1.0E-02)$		$\mathbf{H} = \mathbf{High}$	I = situation (eve	I = situation (event) of major concern							
U = Unlikely (1.0E-02> L > 1.0E-04)		$\mathbf{M} = \mathbf{Moderate}$	$\mathbf{II} = \text{situation (ev}$	ent) of concern			Α	U	EU	BEU	
EU = Extremely Unlikely (1.0E-04 > L > 1.0E-06)		L = Low	III = situation (e	vent) of minor concern	SS	Н	I	I	II	III	
BEU = Beyond Extremely Unlikely (1.0E-06> L)		N = Negligible	IV = situation (ev	vent) of minimal concern	l c	М	п	II	Ш	IV	
Control(s) Type	\mathbf{C}	Offsite (MOI)	Onsite-2 (co-located worker)	Onsite-1 (facility worker)	dae	IVI	11	11	111	1 V	
P = Preventive (reduce event occurrence likelihood) M = Mitigative (reduces event consequences)	H	C ≥ Irreversible,	! ≥ Prompt worker fatality	C ≥ Prompt worker	onse	L	III	III	IV	IV	
Acronyms		other serious effects,	or acute injury that is	fatality or acute injury that	ິ	N	IV	IV	IV	IV	
MOI = Maximally-exposed Offsite Individual		or symptoms which	immediately life-	is immediately life-		•		•	•		
		•	threatening or permanently	threatening or							
		individual's ability to	disabling.	permanently disabling.							
		take protective									
		action.									
	M	$C \ge Mild$, transient	$C \ge Serious injury, no$	C ≥ Serious injury, no							
		adverse effects.	immediate loss of life no	immediate loss of life no							
			permanent disabilities;	permanent disabilities;							
			hospitalization required.	hospitalization required.							



L	,	Mild, transient	Minor injuries; no	Minor injuries; no
		adverse effects > C	hospitalization > C	hospitalization > C
$\overline{\mathbf{N}}$	I	Consequences less	Consequences less than	Consequences less than
		than those for Low	those for Low Consequence	those for Low
		Consequence Level	Level	Consequence Level



Table 11.3 Radiological - MOI Offsite

Hazard	Hazard Description	Baseline Qualitative Risk (without controls)	Preventative (P)/ Mitigative (M)	Residual Qualitative Risk (with controls)	
Non-ionizing Radiation Hazards*	Hazard: N/A. Laser light does not reach any public areas.	L: C: R:		L: C: R:	

*NON-Ionizing Radiation follows rule for "Other Hazard Consequences," derived from Figure C-1, "Example Qualitative Consequence Matrix", DOE-HDBK-1163-2020.											
Likelihood (L, of event)/year	C	onsequence (C, of event)/ye	ear Risk (R, Qualitative	Risk (R, Qualitative Ranking) I = situation (event) of major concern		Risk Matrix					
$\mathbf{A} = \text{Anticipated (L} > 1.0\text{E}-02)$		$\mathbf{H} = \mathbf{High}$	I = situation (eve				Likelihood				
U = Unlikely (1.0E-02 > L > 1.0E-04)		$\mathbf{M} = \mathbf{Moderate}$	$\mathbf{H} = \text{situation (evolution } \mathbf{H} = \mathbf{H} \mathbf{H} \mathbf{H} \mathbf{H} \mathbf{H} \mathbf{H} \mathbf{H} \mathbf{H}$	ent) of concern			Α	U	EU	BEU	
EU = Extremely Unlikely (1.0E-04 > L > 1.0E-06)		L = Low	III = situation (ev	\mathbf{I} = situation (event) of minor concern		Н	I	I	II	III	
BEU = Beyond Extremely Unlikely (1.0E-06> L)		$\mathbf{N} = \text{Negligible}$	IV = situation (ev	vent) of minimal concern	suces	М	п	II	III	IV	
Control(s) Type P = Preventive (reduce event occurrence likelihood) M = Mitigative (reduces event consequences) Acronyms	C	Offsite (MOI)	Insite-2 (co-located worker)	Onsite-1 (facility worker)	edne	171	-11	- 11	111	1 V	
	H	C ≥ Irreversible, (C ≥ Prompt worker fatality	that is fatality or acute injury that	Conse	L	III	III	IV	IV	
		other serious effects,	or acute injury that is			N	IV	IV	IV	IV	
MOI = Maximally-exposed Offsite Individual		or symptoms which	immediately life-	is immediately life-	1						
		could impair an threatening or permanently		threatening or							
		individual's ability to	disabling.	permanently disabling.							
		take protective action.									
	M	C ≥ Mild, transient	C ≥ Serious injury, no	C ≥ Serious injury, no							
		adverse effects.	immediate loss of life no	immediate loss of life no							
			permanent disabilities;	permanent disabilities;							
			hospitalization required.	hospitalization required.							
	L	Mild, transient	Minor injuries; no	Minor injuries; no							
		adverse effects > C	hospitalization > C	hospitalization > C							
	N	Consequences less	Consequences less than	Consequences less than							
			nose for Low Consequence	those for Low							
		Consequence Level	Level	Consequence Level							



Table 11.4 Flammable and Combustible Materials – Onsite -1 Facility Worker

Hazard	Hazard Description	Baseline Qualitative Risk (without controls)	Preventative (P)/ Mitigative (M)	Residual Qualitative Risk (with controls)
Combustible	Hazard:	L:	See Section I Chapter 4	L:
materials (cables,		C:		C:
Boxes, Paper,		R:		R:
wood cribbing,				
etc.)				

Other Hazard Consequences, derived from Figure C-1, "Example Qualitative Consequence Matrix", DOE-HDBK-1163-2020.											
Likelihood (L, of event)/year	C	onsequence (C, of event)/	year Risk (R, Qualitative	Ranking)	Risk Matrix						
$\mathbf{A} = \text{Anticipated } (L > 1.0E-02)$		$\mathbf{H} = \mathbf{High}$	$\mathbf{I} = \text{situation (even}$	I = situation (event) of major concern II = situation (event) of concern				Like	lihood		
U = Unlikely (1.0E-02> L>1.0E-04)		$\mathbf{M} = \mathbf{Moderate}$,				A	U	EU	BEU	
EU = Extremely Unlikely (1.0E-04 > L > 1.0E-06)		$\mathbf{L} = \mathbf{Low}$	`	vent) of minor concern	es	Н	I	I	II	III	
BEU = Beyond Extremely Unlikely (1.0E-06> L)	C	N = Negligible	,	vent) of minimal concern	edneuces	M	II	II	III	IV	
Control(s) Type	C	Offsite (MOI)	Onsite-2 (co-located worker)	Onsite-1 (facility worker)	nbe						
P = Preventive (reduce event occurrence likelihood)	Н	$C \ge Irreversible$,	$C \ge Prompt$ worker fatality	$\mathbf{C} \ge \text{Prompt worker}$	Conse	L	III	III	IV	IV	
M = Mitigative (reduces event consequences) Acronyms		other serious effects,	or acute injury that is	fatality or acute injury that	ర	N	IV	IV	IV	IV	
MOI = Maximally-exposed Offsite Individual		or symptoms which	immediately life-	is immediately life-							
1707 = Maximally exposed offsite individual		•	threatening or permanently	threatening or							
		individual's ability to	disabling.	permanently disabling.							
		take protective action.									
	M	$C \ge Mild$, transient	C ≥ Serious injury, no	C ≥ Serious injury, no							
		adverse effects.	immediate loss of life no	immediate loss of life no							
			permanent disabilities;	permanent disabilities;							
			hospitalization required.	hospitalization required.							
	L	Mild, transient	Minor injuries; no	Minor injuries; no							
		adverse effects > C	hospitalization > C	hospitalization > C							
	N	Consequences less	Consequences less than	Consequences less than							
			those for Low Consequence	those for Low							
		Consequence Level	Level	Consequence Level							



Table 11.5 Flammable and Combustible Materials – Onsite -2 Co-located Worker

Hazard	Hazard Description	Baseline Qualitative Risk (without controls)	Preventative (P)/ Mitigative (M)	Residual Qualitative Risk (with controls)
Combustible	Hazard:	L:	See Section I Chapter 4	L:
materials (cables,		C:		C:
Boxes, Paper,		R:		R:
wood cribbing,				
etc.)				

Other Hazard Consequences, derived from Figure C-1, "Example Qualitative Consequence Matrix", DOE-HDBK-1163-2020.											
Likelihood (L, of event)/year	C	onsequence (C, of event)/	year Risk (R, Qualitative	Ranking)	Risk Matrix						
$\mathbf{A} = \text{Anticipated } (L > 1.0E-02)$		$\mathbf{H} = \mathbf{High}$	I = situation (even	I = situation (event) of major concern II = situation (event) of concern				Likelihood			
U = Unlikely (1.0E-02> L > 1.0E-04)		$\mathbf{M} = \mathbf{Moderate}$	$\mathbf{H} = \text{situation (even}$				Α	U	EU	BEU	
EU = Extremely Unlikely (1.0E-04 > L > 1.0E-06)		$\mathbf{L} = \text{Low}$	$\mathbf{III} = \text{situation (ev}$	vent) of minor concern	Se	Н	I	I	II	III	
BEU = Beyond Extremely Unlikely (1.0E-06> L)		$\mathbf{N} = \text{Negligible}$	IV = situation (ev)	vent) of minimal concern	l ou	M	п	П	III	IV	
Control(s) Type	C	Offsite (MOI)	Onsite-2 (co-located worker)	Onsite-1 (facility worker)	edneuces	171	-11	- 11	111	1 4	
	H	C ≥ Irreversible,	C ≥ Prompt worker fatality		Š	L	III	III	IV	IV	
Acronyms		other serious effects,	or acute injury that is	fatality or acute injury that	Co	N	IV	IV	IV	IV	
MOI = Maximally-exposed Offsite Individual		or symptoms which	immediately life-	is immediately life-							
17701 = Maximally exposed offsite individual		-	threatening or permanently	threatening or							
		individual's ability to	disabling.	permanently disabling.							
		take protective action.									
	M	C ≥ Mild, transient	C ≥ Serious injury, no	C ≥ Serious injury, no							
		adverse effects.	immediate loss of life no	immediate loss of life no							
			permanent disabilities;	permanent disabilities;							
			hospitalization required.	hospitalization required.							
	L	Mild, transient	Minor injuries; no	Minor injuries; no							
		adverse effects > C	hospitalization > C	hospitalization > C							
	N	Consequences less	Consequences less than	Consequences less than							
		than those for Low	those for Low Consequence	those for Low							
		Consequence Level	Level	Consequence Level							



Table 11.6 Flammable and Combustible Materials – MOI Offsite

Hazard	Hazard Description	Baseline Qualitative Risk (without controls)	Preventative (P)/ Mitigative (M)	Residual Qualitative Risk (with controls)
Combustible	Hazard:	L:	See Section I Chapter 4	L:
materials (cables,		C:		C:
Boxes, Paper,		R:		R:
wood cribbing,				
etc.)				

Other Hazard Consequences, derived from Figure C-1, "Example Qualitative Consequence Matrix", DOE-HDBK-1163-2020.											
Likelihood (L, of event)/year	Co	onsequence (C, of event)/ye	ear Risk (R, Qualitative)	Ranking)	Risk Matrix						
$\mathbf{A} = \text{Anticipated } (L > 1.0E-02)$		$\mathbf{H} = \mathbf{High}$	$\mathbf{I} = \text{situation (even}$	vent) of major concern event) of concern				Like	lihood		
U = Unlikely (1.0E-02 > L > 1.0E-04)		$\mathbf{M} = \mathbf{Moderate}$	$\mathbf{II} = \text{situation (even}$				Α	U	EU	BEU	
EU = Extremely Unlikely (1.0E-04 > L > 1.0E-06)		$\mathbf{L} = \mathbf{Low}$	*	vent) of minor concern	sa	Н	I	I	II	III	
BEU = Beyond Extremely Unlikely (1.0E-06> L)		$\mathbf{N} = \text{Negligible}$		vent) of minimal concern	saces	M	II	II	III	IV	
Control(s) Type	C	Offsite (MOI)	onsite-2 (co-located worker)	Onsite-1 (facility worker)	edner	171		-11	111	- 1	
P = Preventive (reduce event occurrence likelihood) M = Mitigative (reduces event consequences)	Н	C ≥ Irreversible, C	C ≥ Prompt worker fatality	C ≥ Prompt worker	St	L	III	III	IV	IV	
Acronyms		other serious effects,	or acute injury that is	fatality or acute injury that	Coı	N	IV	IV	IV	IV	
MOI = Maximally-exposed Offsite Individual		or symptoms which	immediately life-	is immediately life-							
17101 = Maximany exposed offsite marviadar			hreatening or permanently	threatening or							
		individual's ability to	disabling.	permanently disabling.							
		take protective action.									
	M	C ≥ Mild, transient	C ≥ Serious injury, no	C ≥ Serious injury, no							
			immediate loss of life no	immediate loss of life no							
			permanent disabilities;	permanent disabilities;							
			hospitalization required.	hospitalization required.							
	L	Mild, transient	Minor injuries; no	Minor injuries; no							
		adverse effects > C	hospitalization > C	hospitalization > C							
	N	Consequences less	Consequences less than	Consequences less than							
		than those for Low the	nose for Low Consequence	those for Low							
		Consequence Level	Level	Consequence Level							



Table 11.7 Electrical Energy – Onsite-1 Facility Worker

Hazard	Hazard Description	Baseline Qualitative Risk (without controls)	Preventative (P)/ Mitigative (M)	Residual Qualitative Risk (with controls)
High Voltage Exposure	Hazard:	L: C: R:	See Section I Chapter 4	L: C: R:

Other Hazard Consequences, derived from Figure C-1, "Example Qualitative Consequence Matrix", DOE-HDBK-1163-2020.											
Likelihood (L, of event)/year	C	onsequence (C, of event)/	year Risk (R, Qualitative	Ranking)	Risk Matrix						
$\mathbf{A} = \text{Anticipated } (L > 1.0E-02)$		$\mathbf{H} = \mathbf{High}$	I = situation (eve	I = situation (event) of major concernII = situation (event) of concern				Likelihood			
U = Unlikely (1.0E-02 > L > 1.0E-04)		$\mathbf{M} = \mathbf{Moderate}$	$\mathbf{II} = \text{situation (ev}$				Α	U	EU	BEU	
EU = Extremely Unlikely (1.0E-04 > L > 1.0E-06)		$\mathbf{L} = \text{Low}$	III = situation (ex	vent) of minor concern	S	Н	I	I	II	III	
BEU = Beyond Extremely Unlikely $(1.0E-06>L)$		\mathbf{N} = Negligible	IV = situation (evolution)	vent) of minimal concern) ac	М	П	II	III	IV	
Control(s) Type	C	Offsite (MOI)	Onsite-2 (co-located worker)	Onsite-1 (facility worker)	ednences	171	-11	-11	111	17	
P = Preventive (reduce event occurrence likelihood) M = Mitigative (reduces event consequences)	Н	C ≥ Irreversible,	$C \ge Prompt$ worker fatality	Prompt worker fatality $C \ge Prompt$ worker	Conse	L	III	III	IV	IV	
Acronyms		other serious effects,	or acute injury that is	fatality or acute injury that	ŭ	N	IV	IV	IV	IV	
MOI = Maximally-exposed Offsite Individual		or symptoms which	immediately life-	is immediately life-		1					
17101 - Maximany exposed offsite individual		could impair an	threatening or permanently	threatening or							
		individual's ability to	disabling.	permanently disabling.							
		take protective									
	2.7	action.									
	M	$C \ge Mild$, transient	$C \ge Serious injury, no$	C ≥ Serious injury, no							
		adverse effects.	immediate loss of life no	immediate loss of life no							
			permanent disabilities;	permanent disabilities;							
	_	25111	hospitalization required.	hospitalization required.							
	L	Mild, transient	Minor injuries; no	Minor injuries; no							
		adverse effects > C	hospitalization > C	hospitalization > C							
	N	Consequences less	Consequences less than	Consequences less than							
		than those for Low	those for Low Consequence	those for Low							
		Consequence Level	Level	Consequence Level							

Table 11.8 Electrical Energy 1 Onsite-2 Co-located Worker



Hazard	Hazard Description	Baseline Qualitative Risk (without controls)	Preventative (P)/ Mitigative (M)	Residual Qualitative Risk (with controls)
High Voltage	Hazard:	L:	See Section I Chapter 4	L:
Exposure		C:		C:
		R:		R:

Other Hazard Consequences, derived from Figure C-1, "Example Qualitative Consequence Matrix", DOE-HDBK-1163-2020.											
Likelihood (L, of event)/year	C	onsequence (C, of event)	/year Risk (R, Qualitative	Risk (R, Qualitative Ranking)		Risk Matrix					
$\mathbf{A} = \text{Anticipated } (L > 1.0E-02)$		$\mathbf{H} = \mathbf{High}$	I = situation (eve	ent) of major concern vent) of concern				Like	lihood		
U = Unlikely (1.0E-02> L>1.0E-04)		$\mathbf{M} = \mathbf{Moderate}$	$\mathbf{II} = \text{situation (ev}$				Α	U	EU	BEU	
EU = Extremely Unlikely (1.0E-04 > L > 1.0E-06)		$\mathbf{L} = \text{Low}$	$\mathbf{III} = \text{situation (e}$	vent) of minor concern	sa	Н	I	I	II	III	
BEU = Beyond Extremely Unlikely (1.0E-06> L)		\mathbf{N} = Negligible	,	vent) of minimal concern) Juc	M	П	П	III	IV	
Control(s) Type	C	Offsite (MOI)	Onsite-2 (co-located worker)	Onsite-1 (facility worker)	edneuces	- 171		-11	111	17	
P = Preventive (reduce event occurrence likelihood)	H	C ≥ Irreversible,	C ≥ Prompt worker fatality	C ≥ Prompt worker	Conse	L	III	III	IV	IV	
M = Mitigative (reduces event consequences) Acronyms		other serious effects,	or acute injury that is	fatality or acute injury that	ర	N	IV	IV	IV	IV	
MOI = Maximally-exposed Offsite Individual		or symptoms which	immediately life-	is immediately life-		1		1			
17201 = Maximally exposed offsite metricular		could impair an	threatening or permanently	threatening or							
		individual's ability to	disabling.	permanently disabling.							
		take protective									
	N #	action.	G . G	0.0							
	M	$C \ge Mild$, transient	$C \ge Serious injury, no$	C ≥ Serious injury, no							
		adverse effects.	immediate loss of life no	immediate loss of life no							
			permanent disabilities;	permanent disabilities;							
		Miller	hospitalization required.	hospitalization required.							
	L	Mild, transient	Minor injuries; no	Minor injuries; no							
	N. T	adverse effects > C	hospitalization > C	hospitalization > C							
	N	Consequences less	Consequences less than	Consequences less than							
		than those for Low	those for Low Consequence	those for Low							
		Consequence Level	Level	Consequence Level							



Table 11.9 Electrical Energy – MOI Offsite

Hazard	Hazard Description	Baseline Qualitative Risk (without controls)	Preventative (P)/ Mitigative (M)	Residual Qualitative Risk (with controls)
High Voltage Exposure	Hazard:	L: C: R:	See Section I Chapter 4	L: C: R:

Other Hazard Consequences, derived from Figure C-1, "Example Qualitative Consequence Matrix", DOE-HDBK-1163-2020.											
Likelihood (L, of event)/year	Co	onsequence (C, of event)/y	year Risk (R, Qualitative	Ranking)	Risk Matrix						
$\mathbf{A} = \text{Anticipated } (L > 1.0E-02)$		$\mathbf{H} = \mathbf{High}$	$\mathbf{I} = \text{situation (even}$	nt) of major concern				Like	lihood		
U = Unlikely (1.0E-02> L>1.0E-04)		$\mathbf{M} = \mathbf{Moderate}$	$\mathbf{II} = \text{situation (even}$	rent) of concern			Α	U	EU	BEU	
EU = Extremely Unlikely (1.0E-04 > L > 1.0E-06)		L = Low	III = situation (ev	vent) of minor concern	83	Н	I	I	II	III	
BEU = Beyond Extremely Unlikely (1.0E-06> L)		N = Negligible	,	vent) of minimal concern	l Sign	М	II	II	III	IV	
Control(s) Type	C	Offsite (MOI)	Onsite-2 (co-located worker)	Onsite-1 (facility worker)	ednences	171	-11	-11	111	- 1	
P = Preventive (reduce event occurrence likelihood) M = Mitigative (reduces event consequences)	Н	C ≥ Irreversible,	C ≥ Prompt worker fatality	C ≥ Prompt worker	S	L	III	III	IV	IV	
Acronyms		other serious effects,	or acute injury that is	fatality or acute injury that	Cor	N	IV	IV	IV	IV	
MOI = Maximally-exposed Offsite Individual		or symptoms which	immediately life-	is immediately life-							
17101 = Trianmany exposed offsite individual			threatening or permanently	threatening or							
		individual's ability to	disabling.	permanently disabling.							
		take protective									
	N/I	action.	G : G : · · ·	G : G : · · ·							
	IVI	$C \ge Mild$, transient	C ≥ Serious injury, no	$C \ge Serious injury, no$							
		adverse effects.	immediate loss of life no	immediate loss of life no							
			permanent disabilities;	permanent disabilities;							
		25111	hospitalization required.	hospitalization required.							
	L	Mild, transient	Minor injuries; no	Minor injuries; no							
		adverse effects > C	hospitalization > C	hospitalization > C							
	N	Consequences less	Consequences less than	Consequences less than							
			those for Low Consequence	those for Low							
		Consequence Level	Level	Consequence Level							



Table 11.10 Thermal Energy – Onsite-1 Facility Worker

Hazard	Hazard Description	Baseline Qualitative Risk (without controls)	Preventative (P)/ Mitigative (M)	Residual Qualitative Risk (with controls)
Cryogenics	 Hazard: Cryogenics are located at SBN-ND, LArTF, and SBN-FD no cryogenics at SciBooNE 	L: C: R:	See Section I Chapter 4	L: C: R:

Other Hazard Consequences, derived from Figure C-1, "Example Qualitative Consequence Matrix", DOE-HDBK-1163-2020.											
Likelihood (L, of event)/year	C	onsequence (C, of event)/ye	ar Risk (R, Qualitative	Ranking)	Risk	Matri	X				
$\mathbf{A} = \text{Anticipated } (L > 1.0E-02)$		$\mathbf{H} = \mathbf{High}$	\mathbf{I} = situation (eve	event) of major concern event) of concern (event) of minor concern				Like	lihood		
U = Unlikely (1.0E-02 > L > 1.0E-04)		$\mathbf{M} = \mathbf{Moderate}$	II = situation (ev			_	Α	U	EU	BEU	
EU = Extremely Unlikely (1.0E-04 > L > 1.0E-06)		$\mathbf{L} = \mathbf{Low}$	*			Н	I	I	II	III	
BEU = Beyond Extremely Unlikely (1.0E-06> L)		$\mathbf{N} = \text{Negligible}$		vent) of minimal concern) is	M	П	II	III	IV	
Control(s) Type P = Preventive (reduce event occurrence likelihood) M = Mitigative (reduces event consequences)	C	Offsite (MOI)	nsite-2 (co-located worker)	Onsite-1 (facility worker)	dae			-11			
	H	C ≥ Irreversible, C	≥ Prompt worker fatality	C ≥ Prompt worker	Consequences	L	III	III	IV	IV	
M = Mitigative (reduces event consequences) Acronyms		other serious effects,	or acute injury that is	fatality or acute injury that	Ü	N	IV	IV	IV	IV	
MOI = Maximally-exposed Offsite Individual		or symptoms which	immediately life-	is immediately life-							
, ,		could impair an the individual's ability to	nreatening or permanently	threatening or permanently disabling.							
		take protective	disabling.	permanentry disabiling.							
		action.									
	M	C ≥ Mild, transient	C ≥ Serious injury, no	C ≥ Serious injury, no							
		adverse effects.	immediate loss of life no	immediate loss of life no							
			permanent disabilities;	permanent disabilities;							
			hospitalization required.	hospitalization required.							
	L	Mild, transient	Minor injuries; no	Minor injuries; no							
		adverse effects > C	hospitalization > C	hospitalization > C							
	N	Consequences less	Consequences less than	Consequences less than							
			ose for Low Consequence	those for Low							
		Consequence Level	Level	Consequence Level							



Table 11.11 Thermal Energy – Onsite-2 Co-located Worker

Hazard	Hazard Description	Baseline Qualitative Risk (without controls)	Preventative (P)/ Mitigative (M)	Residual Qualitative Risk (with controls)
Cryogenics	 Hazard: Cryogenics at SBN-ND, LArTF, and SBN-FD no cryogenics at SciBooNE 	L: C: R:	See Section I Chapter 4	L: C: R:

Other Hazard Consequences, derived from Figure C-1, "Example Qualitative Consequence Matrix", DOE-HDBK-1163-2020.											
Likelihood (L, of event)/year	C	onsequence (C, of event)/ye	ar Risk (R, Qualitative	Ranking)	Risk	Matri	X				
$\mathbf{A} = \text{Anticipated } (L > 1.0E-02)$		$\mathbf{H} = \mathbf{High}$	\mathbf{I} = situation (eve	I = situation (event) of major concern II = situation (event) of concern III = situation (event) of minor concern				Like	lihood		
U = Unlikely (1.0E-02 > L > 1.0E-04)		$\mathbf{M} = \mathbf{Moderate}$	II = situation (ev			_	Α	U	EU	BEU	
EU = Extremely Unlikely (1.0E-04 > L > 1.0E-06)		$\mathbf{L} = \mathbf{Low}$	*			Н	I	I	II	III	
BEU = Beyond Extremely Unlikely (1.0E-06> L)		$\mathbf{N} = \text{Negligible}$		vent) of minimal concern) is	M	П	II	III	IV	
Control(s) Type P = Preventive (reduce event occurrence likelihood) M = Mitigative (reduces event consequences)	C	Offsite (MOI)	nsite-2 (co-located worker)	Onsite-1 (facility worker)	dae			-11			
	H	C ≥ Irreversible, C	! ≥ Prompt worker fatality	C ≥ Prompt worker	Consequences	L	III	III	IV	IV	
M = Mitigative (reduces event consequences) Acronyms		other serious effects,	or acute injury that is	fatality or acute injury that	ت	N	IV	IV	IV	IV	
MOI = Maximally-exposed Offsite Individual		or symptoms which	immediately life-	is immediately life-						<u> </u>	
7 1			reatening or permanently	threatening or							
		individual's ability to take protective	disabling.	permanently disabling.							
		action.									
	M	C ≥ Mild, transient	C ≥ Serious injury, no	C ≥ Serious injury, no							
		adverse effects.	immediate loss of life no	immediate loss of life no							
			permanent disabilities;	permanent disabilities;							
			hospitalization required.	hospitalization required.							
	L	Mild, transient	Minor injuries; no	Minor injuries; no							
		adverse effects > C	hospitalization > C	hospitalization > C							
	N		Consequences less than	Consequences less than							
			ose for Low Consequence	those for Low							
		Consequence Level	Level	Consequence Level							



Table 11.12 Thermal Energy – MOI Offsite

Hazard	Hazard Description	Baseline Qualitative Risk (without controls)	Preventative (P)/ Mitigative (M)	Residual Qualitative Risk (with controls)
Cryogenics	 Hazard: Cryogenics systems at SBN-ND, LArTF, and SBN-FD no cryogens at SciBooNE 	L: C: R:	See Section I Chapter 4	L: C: R:

Other Hazard Consequences, derived from Figure C-1, "Example Qualitative Consequence Matrix", DOE-HDBK-1163-2020.											
Likelihood (L, of event)/year	C	onsequence (C, of event)/y	ear Risk (R, Qualitative	Ranking)	Risl	Matri	X				
$\mathbf{A} = \text{Anticipated } (L > 1.0\text{E}-02)$		$\mathbf{H} = \text{High}$	I = situation (eve	I = situation (event) of major concern II = situation (event) of concern				Like	lihood		
U = Unlikely (1.0E-02> L > 1.0E-04)		$\mathbf{M} = \mathbf{Moderate}$	$\mathbf{II} = \text{situation (evolution (evolution)}$				Α	U	EU	BEU	
EU = Extremely Unlikely (1.0E-04 > L > 1.0E-06)		L = Low	III = situation (evolution)	vent) of minor concern	ences	Н	I	I	II	III	
BEU = Beyond Extremely Unlikely (1.0E-06> L)		N = Negligible	IV = situation (ev	vent) of minimal concern		M	П	II	III	IV	
Control(s) Type P = Preventive (reduce event occurrence likelihood) M = Mitigative (reduces event consequences)	C	Offsite (MOI)	Onsite-2 (co-located worker)	Onsite-1 (facility worker)	edne	171	-11	-11	111	1 4	
	Н	C ≥ Irreversible,	C ≥ Prompt worker fatality		Conse	L	III	III	IV	IV	
Acronyms		other serious effects,	or acute injury that is	fatality or acute injury that	0	N	IV	IV	IV	IV	
MOI = Maximally-exposed Offsite Individual		or symptoms which	immediately life-	is immediately life-					•		
J			threatening or permanently	threatening or							
		individual's ability to	disabling.	permanently disabling.							
		take protective action.									
	M	C ≥ Mild, transient	C ≥ Serious injury, no	C ≥ Serious injury, no							
		adverse effects.	immediate loss of life no	immediate loss of life no							
			permanent disabilities;	permanent disabilities;							
			hospitalization required.	hospitalization required.							
	L	Mild, transient	Minor injuries; no	Minor injuries; no							
		adverse effects > C	hospitalization $> C$	hospitalization > C							
	N	Consequences less	Consequences less than	Consequences less than							
		than those for Low t	hose for Low Consequence	those for Low							
		Consequence Level	Level	Consequence Level							



Table 11.13 Kinetic Energy – Onsite-1 Facility Worker

Hazard	Hazard Description	Baseline Qualitative Risk (without controls)	Preventative (P)/ Mitigative (M)	Residual Qualitative Risk (with controls)
Power tools	Hazard:	L:	See Section I Chapter 4	L:
Tower tools		C:		C:
		R:		R:
Pumps and	Hazard:	L:	See Section I Chapter 4	L:
Motors		C:		C:
		R:		R:

Other Hazard Consequences, derived from Figure C-1, "Example Qualitative Consequence Matrix", DOE-HDBK-1163-2020.											
Likelihood (L, of event)/year	C	onsequence (C, of event)/y	ear Risk (R, Qualitative	Ranking)	Risk	Matri	X				
$\mathbf{A} = \text{Anticipated } (L > 1.0E-02)$		$\mathbf{H} = \mathbf{High}$	I = situation (even	nt) of major concern				Like	lihood		
U = Unlikely (1.0E-02 > L > 1.0E-04)		$\mathbf{M} = \mathbf{Moderate}$	$\mathbf{II} = \text{situation (even}$			1	Α	U	EU	BEU	
EU = Extremely Unlikely (1.0E-04 > L > 1.0E-06)		$\mathbf{L} = \text{Low}$,	vent) of minor concern	s	Н	I	I	II	III	
BEU = Beyond Extremely Unlikely (1.0E-06> L)		N = Negligible		vent) of minimal concern	ences	M	П	II	III	IV	
Control(s) Type	C	Offsite (MOI)	Onsite-2 (co-located worker)	Onsite-1 (facility worker)	nb	- 111		- 11	111		
P = Preventive (reduce event occurrence likelihood) M = Mitigative (reduces event consequences)	Н	C ≥ Irreversible,	C ≥ Prompt worker fatality	C ≥ Prompt worker	onsedu	L	III	III	IV	IV	
Acronyms		other serious effects,	or acute injury that is	fatality or acute injury that	C	N	IV	IV	IV	IV	
MOI = Maximally-exposed Offsite Individual		or symptoms which	immediately life-	is immediately life-							
J. J. P. L.		•	threatening or permanently	threatening or							
		individual's ability to	disabling.	permanently disabling.							
		take protective action.									
	M	C ≥ Mild, transient	C ≥ Serious injury, no	C ≥ Serious injury, no							
		adverse effects.	immediate loss of life no	immediate loss of life no							
			permanent disabilities;	permanent disabilities;							
			hospitalization required.	hospitalization required.							
	L	Mild, transient	Minor injuries; no	Minor injuries; no							
		adverse effects > C	hospitalization > C	hospitalization > C							
	N	Consequences less	Consequences less than	Consequences less than							
			hose for Low Consequence	those for Low							
		Consequence Level	Level	Consequence Level							



Table 11.14 Kinetic Energy – Onsite-2 Co-located Worker

Hazard	Hazard Description	Baseline Qualitative Risk (without controls)	Preventative (P)/ Mitigative (M)	Residual Qualitative Risk (with controls)
Power tools	Hazard:	L: C:	See Section I Chapter 4	L: C:
		R:		R:
Pumps and	Hazard:	L:	See Section I Chapter 4	L:
Motors		C:		C:
		R:		R:

Other Hazard Consequences, derived from Figure C-1, "Example Qualitative Consequence Matrix", DOE-HDBK-1163-2020.										
Likelihood (L, of event)/year	C	onsequence (C, of event)/ye	ear Risk (R, Qualitative	Ranking)	Risk	Matri	X			
$\mathbf{A} = \text{Anticipated } (L > 1.0E-02)$		$\mathbf{H} = \mathbf{High}$	I = situation (eve	nt) of major concern				Like	lihood	
U = Unlikely (1.0E-02> L > 1.0E-04)		$\mathbf{M} = \mathbf{Moderate}$	$\mathbf{II} = \text{situation (ev}$	ent) of concern			Α	U	EU	BEU
EU = Extremely Unlikely (1.0E-04 > L > 1.0E-06)		L = Low	III = situation (evaluation	vent) of minor concern	S.	Н	I	I	II	III
BEU = Beyond Extremely Unlikely (1.0E-06> L)		$\mathbf{N} = \text{Negligible}$	IV = situation (evolution)	vent) of minimal concern	nces	M	TT	II	III	IV
Control(s) Type	\mathbf{C}	Offsite (MOI)	onsite-2 (co-located worker)	Onsite-1 (facility worker)	edne	IVI	11	11	111	1 V
P = Preventive (reduce event occurrence likelihood)	Н	C ≥ Irreversible, (C ≥ Prompt worker fatality	C ≥ Prompt worker	onse	L	III	III	IV	IV
M = Mitigative (reduces event consequences)		other serious effects,	or acute injury that is	fatality or acute injury that	ప	N	IV	IV	IV	IV
Acronyms MOI = Maximally-exposed Offsite Individual		or symptoms which	immediately life-	is immediately life-						
WIOI - Waximany-exposed Offsite murvidual		could impair an the	hreatening or permanently	threatening or						
		individual's ability to	disabling.	permanently disabling.						
		take protective								
		action.								
	M	$C \ge Mild$, transient	$C \ge Serious injury, no$	C ≥ Serious injury, no						
		adverse effects.	immediate loss of life no	immediate loss of life no						
			permanent disabilities;	permanent disabilities;						
			hospitalization required.	hospitalization required.						
	L	Mild, transient	Minor injuries; no	Minor injuries; no						
		adverse effects > C	hospitalization $> C$	hospitalization $> \mathbf{C}$						



Table 11.15 Kinetic Energy – MOI Offsite

Hazard	Hazard Description	Baseline Qualitative Risk (without controls)	Preventative (P)/ Mitigative (M)	Residual Qualitative Risk (with controls)
Power tools	Hazard:	L: C:	See Section I Chapter 4	L: C:
		R:		R:
Pumps and	Hazard:	L:	See Section I Chapter 4	L:
Motors		C:		C:
		R:		R:

Other Hazard Consequences, derived from Figure C-1, "Example Qualitative Consequence Matrix", DOE-HDBK-1163-2020.										
Likelihood (L, of event)/year	C	onsequence (C, of event)/ye	ear Risk (R, Qualitative	Ranking)	Risk	Matri	X			
$\mathbf{A} = \text{Anticipated } (L > 1.0E-02)$		$\mathbf{H} = \mathbf{High}$	$\mathbf{I} = \text{situation (eve}$	nt) of major concern				Like	lihood	
U = Unlikely (1.0E-02 > L > 1.0E-04)		$\mathbf{M} = \mathbf{Moderate}$	$\mathbf{II} = \text{situation (ev}$	ent) of concern			Α	U	EU	BEU
EU = Extremely Unlikely (1.0E-04 > L > 1.0E-06)		L = Low	$\mathbf{III} = \text{situation (e}$	vent) of minor concern	S.	Н	I	I	II	III
BEU = Beyond Extremely Unlikely (1.0E-06> L)		$\mathbf{N} = \text{Negligible}$	IV = situation (evolution)	vent) of minimal concern	nces	M	TT	II	III	IV
Control(s) Type	\mathbf{C}	Offsite (MOI)	nsite-2 (co-located worker)	Onsite-1 (facility worker)	edne	IVI	11	11	111	1 V
P = Preventive (reduce event occurrence likelihood)	Н	C ≥ Irreversible, C	C ≥ Prompt worker fatality	C ≥ Prompt worker	onse	L	III	III	IV	IV
M = Mitigative (reduces event consequences)		other serious effects,	or acute injury that is	fatality or acute injury that	ప	N	IV	IV	IV	IV
Acronyms MOI = Maximally-exposed Offsite Individual		or symptoms which	immediately life-	is immediately life-						
WOI = Maximany-exposed Offsite individual		could impair an th	reatening or permanently	threatening or						
		individual's ability to	disabling.	permanently disabling.						
		take protective								
		action.								
	M	$C \ge Mild$, transient	C ≥ Serious injury, no	C ≥ Serious injury, no						
		adverse effects.	immediate loss of life no	immediate loss of life no						
			permanent disabilities;	permanent disabilities;						
			hospitalization required.	hospitalization required.						
	L	Mild, transient	Minor injuries; no	Minor injuries; no						
		adverse effects > C	hospitalization $> C$	hospitalization > C						



Table 11.16 Potential Energy – Onsite-1 Facility Worker

Hazard	Hazard Description	Baseline Qualitative Risk (without controls)	Preventative (P)/ Mitigative (M)	Residual Qualitative Risk (with controls)
Crane Operations	Hazard: Overhead cranes are found in SBN-ND, LArTF and SBN-FD	L: C: R:	See Section I Chapter 4	L: C: R:
Vacuum/ Pressure Vessels/Piping	Hazard:	L: C: R:	See Section I Chapter 4	L: C: R:
Vacuum Pumps	Hazard: Vacuum pumps are found in SBN-ND and SBN-FD	L: C: R:	See Section I Chapter 4	L: C: R:
Material Handling	Hazard:	L: C: R:	See Section I Chapter 4	L: C: R:

Other Hazard Consequences, derived from Figure C-1, "Example Qualitative Consequence Matrix", DOE-HDBK-1163-2020.												
Likelihood (L, of event)/year	Co	onsequence (C, of event)	/year	Risk (R, Qualitative	Ranking)	Risk Matrix						
$\mathbf{A} = \text{Anticipated } (L > 1.0E-02)$		$\mathbf{H} = \mathbf{High}$		I = situation (eve	nt) of major concern							
U = Unlikely (1.0E-02> L > 1.0E-04)		$\mathbf{M} = \mathbf{Moderate}$		II = situation (ev	ent) of concern			A	U	EU	BEU	
EU = Extremely Unlikely (1.0E-04 > L > 1.0E-06)		L = Low		`	vent) of minor concern	9	Н	I	I	II	III	
BEU = Beyond Extremely Unlikely (1.0E-06> L)	ļ.,	N = Negligible			vent) of minimal concern	94	М	П	II	III	IV	
Control(s) Type	C	Offsite (MOI)	Onsite	e-2 (co-located worker)	Onsite-1 (facility worker)	71.0	ļ — · · ·	11	-11	111	1,4	
P = Preventive (reduce event occurrence likelihood)	Н	$C \ge Irreversible$,	$C \ge F$	Prompt worker fatality	C ≥ Prompt worker	0340	L	III	III	IV	IV	
M = Mitigative (reduces event consequences) Acronyms		other serious effects,		acute injury that is	fatality or acute injury that	2	N	IV	IV	IV	IV	
MOI = Maximally-exposed Offsite Individual		or symptoms which could impair an individual's ability to take protective action.		immediately life- tening or permanently disabling.	is immediately life- threatening or permanently disabling.			•				



M	C ≥ Mild, transient adverse effects.	C ≥ Serious injury, no immediate loss of life no	C ≥ Serious injury, no immediate loss of life no
		permanent disabilities;	permanent disabilities;
		hospitalization required.	hospitalization required.
\mathbf{L}	Mild, transient	Minor injuries; no	Minor injuries; no
	adverse effects > C	hospitalization > C	hospitalization $> \mathbf{C}$
N	Consequences less	Consequences less than	Consequences less than
	than those for Low	those for Low Consequence	those for Low
	Consequence Level	Level	Consequence Level



Table 11.17 Potential Energy – Onsite-2 Co-located Worker

Hazard	Hazard Description	Baseline Qualitative Risk (without controls)	Preventative (P)/ Mitigative (M)	Residual Qualitative Risk (with controls)
Crane Operations	Hazard: Overhead cranes are found in SBN-ND, LArTF and SBN-FD	L: C: R:	See Section I Chapter 4	L: C: R:
Vacuum/ Pressure Vessels/Piping	Hazard:	L: C: R:	See Section I Chapter 4	L: C: R:
Vacuum Pumps	Hazard: Vacuum pumps are found in SBN-ND and SBN-FD	L: C: R:	See Section I Chapter 4	L: C: R:
Material Handling	Hazard:	L: C: R:	See Section I Chapter 4	L: C: R:

Other Hazard Consequences, derived from Figure C-1, "Example Qualitative Consequence Matrix", DOE-HDBK-1163-2020.												
Likelihood (L, of event)/year	Co	onsequence (C, of event))/year	Risk (R, Qualitative	Ranking)	Risk Matrix						
$\mathbf{A} = \text{Anticipated } (L > 1.0E-02)$		$\mathbf{H} = \mathbf{High}$		I = situation (eve	nt) of major concern		I			lihood		
U = Unlikely (1.0E-02> L > 1.0E-04)		$\mathbf{M} = \mathbf{Moderate}$		II = situation (ev	ent) of concern			A	U	EU	BEU	
EU = Extremely Unlikely (1.0E-04 > L > 1.0E-06)		$\mathbf{L} = \text{Low}$		`	vent) of minor concern	á	Н	I	I	II	III	
BEU = Beyond Extremely Unlikely (1.0E-06> L)		N = Negligible		,	vent) of minimal concern	Juc	М	П	II	III	IV	
Control(s) Type	C	Offsite (MOI)	Onsite	e-2 (co-located worker)	Onsite-1 (facility worker)		• •••		11	111	1,4	
P = Preventive (reduce event occurrence likelihood)	Н	$C \ge Irreversible$,	C ≥ F	Prompt worker fatality	C ≥ Prompt worker	onse	L	III	III	IV	IV	
M = Mitigative (reduces event consequences) Acronyms		other serious effects,		acute injury that is	fatality or acute injury that	Ü	N	IV	IV	IV	IV	
MOI = Maximally-exposed Offsite Individual		or symptoms which could impair an individual's ability to take protective action.		immediately life- tening or permanently disabling.	is immediately life- threatening or permanently disabling.							



M	C ≥ Mild, transient adverse effects.	C ≥ Serious injury, no immediate loss of life no	C ≥ Serious injury, no immediate loss of life no
		permanent disabilities;	permanent disabilities;
		hospitalization required.	hospitalization required.
\mathbf{L}	Mild, transient	Minor injuries; no	Minor injuries; no
	adverse effects > C	hospitalization > C	hospitalization $> \mathbf{C}$
N	Consequences less	Consequences less than	Consequences less than
	than those for Low	those for Low Consequence	those for Low
	Consequence Level	Level	Consequence Level



Table 11.18 Potential Energy – MOI Offsite

Hazard	Hazard Description	Baseline Qualitative Risk (without controls)	Preventative (P)/ Mitigative (M)	Residual Qualitative Risk (with controls)
Crane Operations	Hazard:	L:	See Section I Chapter 4	L:
	Overhead cranes are found in SBN-ND, LArTF and SBN-FD	C: R:		C: R:
Vacuum/	Hazard:	L:	See Section I Chapter 4	L:
Pressure		C:		C:
Vessels/Piping		R:		R:
Vacuum Pumps	Hazard:	L:	See Section I Chapter 4	L:
		C:		C:
	Vacuum pumps are found in SBN-ND and SBN-FD	R:		R:
Material Handling	Hazard:	L:	See Section I Chapter 4	L:
		C:		C:
		R:		R:

Other Hazard Consequences, derived from Figure C-1, "Example Qualitative Consequence Matrix", DOE-HDBK-1163-2020.													
Likelihood (L, of event)/year	Co	onsequence (C, of event)	/year	Risk (R, Qualitative	Ranking)	Risk Matrix							
$\mathbf{A} = \text{Anticipated } (L > 1.0E-02)$		$\mathbf{H} = \mathbf{High}$		I = situation (eve	nt) of major concern				Likelihood				
U = Unlikely (1.0E-02> L > 1.0E-04)		$\mathbf{M} = \mathbf{Moderate}$		II = situation (ev	ent) of concern			Α	U	EU	BEU		
EU = Extremely Unlikely (1.0E-04 > L > 1.0E-06)		L = Low		,	vent) of minor concern	ğ	Н	I	I	II	III		
BEU = Beyond Extremely Unlikely (1.0E-06> L)		\mathbf{N} = Negligible			vent) of minimal concern	1	М	П	II	III	IV		
Control(s) Type	C	Offsite (MOI)	Onsite	e-2 (co-located worker)	Onsite-1 (facility worker)		ļ <u>'</u>	11		111			
 P = Preventive (reduce event occurrence likelihood) M = Mitigative (reduces event consequences) 	Н	C ≥ Irreversible,	C ≥ F	Prompt worker fatality	C ≥ Prompt worker	once	L	III	III	IV	IV		
Acronyms		other serious effects,		acute injury that is	fatality or acute injury that	۲	N	IV	IV	IV	IV		
MOI = Maximally-exposed Offsite Individual		or symptoms which could impair an individual's ability to take protective action.		immediately life- tening or permanently disabling.	is immediately life- threatening or permanently disabling.								



M	C ≥ Mild, transient adverse effects.	C ≥ Serious injury, no immediate loss of life no	C ≥ Serious injury, no immediate loss of life no
		permanent disabilities;	permanent disabilities;
		hospitalization required.	hospitalization required.
\mathbf{L}	Mild, transient	Minor injuries; no	Minor injuries; no
	adverse effects > C	hospitalization > C	hospitalization $> C$
N	Consequences less	Consequences less than	Consequences less than
	than those for Low	those for Low Consequence	those for Low
	Consequence Level	Level	Consequence Level



Table 11.19 Other hazards – Onsite-1 Facility Worker

Hazard	Hazard Description	Baseline Qualitative Risk (without controls)	Preventative (P)/ Mitigative (M)	Residual Qualitative Risk (with controls)
Confined Spaces	Hazard:	L: C R:	See Section I Chapter 4	L: C: R:

Other Hazard Consequences, derived from Figure C-1, "Example Qualitative Consequence Matrix", DOE-HDBK-1163-2020.												
Likelihood (L, of event)/year	C	onsequence (C, of event)/ye	ear Risk (R, Qualitative	Ranking)	Risk	Matri	x					
A = Anticipated (L > 1.0E-02)		$\mathbf{H} = \mathbf{High}$	I = situation (even)	(event) of major concern		Likelihood						
U = Unlikely (1.0E-02 > L > 1.0E-04)		$\mathbf{M} = \mathbf{Moderate}$	$\mathbf{H} = \text{situation (even}$	*			Α	U	EU	BEU		
EU = Extremely Unlikely (1.0E-04 > L > 1.0E-06)		$\mathbf{L} = \mathbf{Low}$	`	vent) of minor concern	es	Н	I	I	II	III		
BEU = Beyond Extremely Unlikely (1.0E-06> L)	~	N = Negligible	\	vent) of minimal concern	ences	M	II	II	III	IV		
Control(s) Type	C	Offsite (MOI)	Onsite-2 (co-located worker)	Onsite-1 (facility worker)	nba							
P = Preventive (reduce event occurrence likelihood) M = Mitigative (reduces event consequences)	Н	$C \ge Irreversible,$	C ≥ Prompt worker fatality	$\mathbf{C} \ge \text{Prompt worker}$	Consequ	L	III	III	IV	IV		
Acronyms		other serious effects,	or acute injury that is	fatality or acute injury that is immediately life-	ರ	N	IV	IV	IV	IV		
MOI = Maximally-exposed Offsite Individual		or symptoms which	immediately life-									
naor mammany enposes on the marriage			hreatening or permanently	threatening or								
		individual's ability to	disabling.	permanently disabling.								
		take protective action.										
	M	$C \ge Mild$, transient	C ≥ Serious injury, no	C ≥ Serious injury, no								
		′	immediate loss of life no	immediate loss of life no								
			permanent disabilities;	permanent disabilities;								
			hospitalization required.	hospitalization required.								
	L	Mild, transient	Minor injuries; no	Minor injuries; no								
		adverse effects > C	hospitalization > C	hospitalization > C								
	N	Consequences less	Consequences less than	Consequences less than								
			nose for Low Consequence	those for Low								
		Consequence Level	Level	Consequence Level								



Table 11.20 Other hazards – Onsite-2 Co-located Worker

Hazard	Hazard Description	Baseline Qualitative Risk (without controls)	Preventative (P)/ Mitigative (M)	Residual Qualitative Risk (with controls)
Confined Spaces	Hazard:	L: C: R:	See Section I Chapter 4	L: C: R:

Other Hazard Consequences, derived from Figure C-1, "Example Qualitative Consequence Matrix", DOE-HDBK-1163-2020.										
Likelihood (L, of event)/year	Co	onsequence (C, of event)/y	ear Risk (R, Qualitative	Ranking)	Risk	Matri	X			
$\mathbf{A} = \text{Anticipated } (L > 1.0E-02)$		$\mathbf{H} = \mathbf{High}$	I = situation (even	nt) of major concern			Likelihoo			
U = Unlikely (1.0E-02 > L > 1.0E-04)		$\mathbf{M} = \mathbf{Moderate}$	$\mathbf{II} = \text{situation (even}$	ent) of concern			Α	U	EU	BEU
EU = Extremely Unlikely (1.0E-04 > L > 1.0E-06)		$\mathbf{L} = \mathbf{Low}$		vent) of minor concern	Se	Н	I	I	II	III
BEU = Beyond Extremely Unlikely (1.0E-06> L)		$\mathbf{N} = \text{Negligible}$		vent) of minimal concern	one	М	П	II	III	IV
Control(s) Type	C	Offsite (MOI)	Onsite-2 (co-located worker)	Onsite-1 (facility worker)	nb	171	-11	11	111	- '
P = Preventive (reduce event occurrence likelihood)M = Mitigative (reduces event consequences)	H	C ≥ Irreversible,	C ≥ Prompt worker fatality	C ≥ Prompt worker	Consequences	L	III	III	IV	IV
Acronyms		other serious effects,	or acute injury that is	fatality or acute injury that	ŭ	N	IV	IV	IV	IV
MOI = Maximally-exposed Offsite Individual		or symptoms which	immediately life-	is immediately life-			•	•		
			threatening or permanently	threatening or						
		individual's ability to take protective	disabling.	permanently disabling.						
		action.								
	M	$C \ge Mild$, transient	C ≥ Serious injury, no	C ≥ Serious injury, no						
		adverse effects.	immediate loss of life no	immediate loss of life no						
			permanent disabilities;	permanent disabilities;						
			hospitalization required.	hospitalization required.						
	L	Mild, transient	Minor injuries; no	Minor injuries; no						
		adverse effects > C	hospitalization > C	hospitalization > C						
	N	Consequences less	Consequences less than	Consequences less than						
			hose for Low Consequence	those for Low						
		Consequence Level	Level	Consequence Level						



Table 11.21 Other hazards - MOI Offsite

Hazard	Hazard Description	Baseline Qualitative Risk (without controls)	Preventative (P)/ Mitigative (M)	Residual Qualitative Risk (with controls)
Confined Spaces	Hazard:	L:	See Section I Chapter 4	L:
		C:		C:
		R:		R:

Other Hazard Consequences, derived from Figure C-1, "Example Qualitative Consequence Matrix", DOE-HDBK-1163-2020.										
Likelihood (L, of event)/year	C	onsequence (C, of event)/y	year Risk (R, Qualitative	Ranking)	Risl	Matr	X			
A = Anticipated (L > 1.0E-02)		$\mathbf{H} = \mathbf{High}$	I = situation (even)	nt) of major concern			Likelihood			
U = Unlikely (1.0E-02> L>1.0E-04)		$\mathbf{M} = \mathbf{Moderate}$	II = situation (evo	*		ı	A	U	EU	BEU
EU = Extremely Unlikely (1.0E-04 > L > 1.0E-06)		$\mathbf{L} = \mathbf{Low}$	*	event) of minor concern	es	Н	I	I	II	III
BEU = Beyond Extremely Unlikely (1.0E-06> L)	~	N = Negligible		vent) of minimal concern	enc	M	II	II	III	IV
Control(s) Type	C	Offsite (MOI)	Onsite-2 (co-located worker)	Onsite-1 (facility worker)	sanences					
P = Preventive (reduce event occurrence likelihood)	Н	C ≥ Irreversible,	C ≥ Prompt worker fatality	$C \ge Prompt worker$	Conse	L	III	III	IV	IV
M = Mitigative (reduces event consequences) Acronyms		other serious effects,	or acute injury that is	fatality or acute injury that	ರ	N	IV	IV	IV	IV
MOI = Maximally-exposed Offsite Individual		or symptoms which	immediately life-	is immediately life-		· L				
1701 - Maximany exposed offsite individual			threatening or permanently	threatening or						
		individual's ability to	disabling.	permanently disabling.						
		take protective action.								
	M	$C \ge Mild$, transient	C ≥ Serious injury, no	C ≥ Serious injury, no						
	1.2	adverse effects.	immediate loss of life no	immediate loss of life no						
		daverse cricets.	permanent disabilities;	permanent disabilities;						
			hospitalization required.	hospitalization required.						
	L	Mild, transient	Minor injuries; no	Minor injuries; no						
		adverse effects > C	hospitalization > C	hospitalization > C						
	N	Consequences less	Consequences less than	Consequences less than						
			those for Low Consequence	those for Low						
		Consequence Level	Level	Consequence Level						



Table 11.22 Access & Egress – Onsite-1 Facility Worker

Hazard	Hazard Description	Baseline Qualitative Risk (without controls)	Preventative (P)/ Mitigative (M)	Residual Qualitative Risk (with controls)
Life Safety Egress	Hazard:	L: C: R:	See Section I Chapter 4	L: C: R:

Other Hazard Consequences, derived from Figure C-1, "Example Qualitative Consequence Matrix", DOE-HDBK-1163-2020.													
Likelihood (L, of event)/year	C	onsequence (C, of event)/y	ear Risk (R, Qualitative	tive Ranking) Risk Matrix						Risk Matrix			
A = Anticipated (L > 1.0E-02)		$\mathbf{H} = \text{High}$ $\mathbf{I} = \text{situation (event) of m}$		nt) of major concern		Likelihood							
U = Unlikely (1.0E-02> L>1.0E-04)		$\mathbf{M} = \mathbf{Moderate}$	$\mathbf{H} = \text{situation (even}$				A	U	EU	BEU			
EU = Extremely Unlikely (1.0E-04 > L >1.0E-06)		$\mathbf{L} = \mathbf{Low}$	`	vent) of minor concern	ses	Н	I	I	II	III			
BEU = Beyond Extremely Unlikely (1.0E-06> L)	<u>C</u>	N = Negligible		vent) of minimal concern	enc	M	II	II	III	IV			
Control(s) Type P = Preventive (reduce event occurrence likelihood)	C	Offsite (MOI)	Onsite-2 (co-located worker)	Onsite-1 (facility worker)	nbə	_	TTT	777	13.7	13.7			
M = Mitigative (reduces event consequences)	H		$C \ge Prompt worker fatality$	$\mathbf{C} \ge \text{Prompt worker}$	Consequences	L	III	III	IV	IV			
Acronyms		other serious effects,	or acute injury that is	fatality or acute injury that is immediately life-		N	IV	IV	IV	IV			
MOI = Maximally-exposed Offsite Individual		or symptoms which	• •										
		could impair an tindividual's ability to	threatening or permanently disabling.	threatening or permanently disabling.									
		take protective	disabiling.	permanentry disabiling.									
		action.											
	M	C ≥ Mild, transient	C ≥ Serious injury, no	C ≥ Serious injury, no									
		adverse effects.	immediate loss of life no	immediate loss of life no									
			permanent disabilities;	permanent disabilities;									
			hospitalization required.	hospitalization required.									
	L	Mild, transient	Minor injuries; no	Minor injuries; no									
	76. T	adverse effects > C	hospitalization > C	hospitalization > C									
	IN	Consequences less than those for Low	Consequences less than hose for Low Consequence	Consequences less than those for Low									
		Consequence Level	Level	Consequence Level									



Table 11.23 Access & Egress – Onsite-2 Co-located Worker

Hazard	Hazard Description	Baseline Qualitative Risk (without controls)	Preventative (P)/ Mitigative (M)	Residual Qualitative Risk (with controls)
Life Safety Egress	Hazard:	L:	See Section I Chapter 4	L:
		C:		C:
		R:		R:

Other Hazard Consequences, derived from Figure C-1, "Example Qualitative Consequence Matrix", DOE-HDBK-1163-2020.													
Likelihood (L, of event)/year	C	onsequence (C, of event)/y	ear Risk (R, Qualitative	tive Ranking) Risk Matrix						Risk Matrix			
A = Anticipated (L > 1.0E-02)		$\mathbf{H} = \text{High}$ $\mathbf{I} = \text{situation (event) of m}$		nt) of major concern		Likelihood							
U = Unlikely (1.0E-02> L>1.0E-04)		$\mathbf{M} = \mathbf{Moderate}$	$\mathbf{H} = \text{situation (even}$				A	U	EU	BEU			
EU = Extremely Unlikely (1.0E-04 > L >1.0E-06)		$\mathbf{L} = \mathbf{Low}$	`	vent) of minor concern	ses	Н	I	I	II	III			
BEU = Beyond Extremely Unlikely (1.0E-06> L)	<u>C</u>	N = Negligible		vent) of minimal concern	enc	M	II	II	III	IV			
Control(s) Type P = Preventive (reduce event occurrence likelihood)	C	Offsite (MOI)	Onsite-2 (co-located worker)	Onsite-1 (facility worker)	nbə	_	TTT	777	13.7	13.7			
M = Mitigative (reduces event consequences)	H		$C \ge Prompt worker fatality$	$\mathbf{C} \ge \text{Prompt worker}$	Consequences	L	III	III	IV	IV			
Acronyms		other serious effects,	or acute injury that is	fatality or acute injury that is immediately life-		N	IV	IV	IV	IV			
MOI = Maximally-exposed Offsite Individual		or symptoms which	• •										
		could impair an tindividual's ability to	threatening or permanently disabling.	threatening or permanently disabling.									
		take protective	disabiling.	permanentry disabiling.									
		action.											
	M	C ≥ Mild, transient	C ≥ Serious injury, no	C ≥ Serious injury, no									
		adverse effects.	immediate loss of life no	immediate loss of life no									
			permanent disabilities;	permanent disabilities;									
			hospitalization required.	hospitalization required.									
	L	Mild, transient	Minor injuries; no	Minor injuries; no									
	76. T	adverse effects > C	hospitalization > C	hospitalization > C									
	IN	Consequences less than those for Low	Consequences less than hose for Low Consequence	Consequences less than those for Low									
		Consequence Level	Level	Consequence Level									



Table 11.24 Access & Egress - MOI Offsite

Hazard	Hazard Description	Baseline Qualitative Risk (without controls)	Preventative (P)/ Mitigative (M)	Residual Qualitative Risk (with controls)
Life Safety Egress	Hazard:	L:	See Section I Chapter 4	L:
		C:		C:
		R:		R:

Other Hazard Consequences, derived from Figure C-1, "Example Qualitative Consequence Matrix", DOE-HDBK-1163-2020.										
Likelihood (L, of event)/year	C	onsequence (C, of event)/y	ear Risk (R, Qualitative	Risk (R, Qualitative Ranking) Risk Matrix						
A = Anticipated (L > 1.0E-02)		$\mathbf{H} = \mathbf{High}$	$\mathbf{H} = \text{High}$ $\mathbf{I} = \text{situation (event) of major concern}$							
U = Unlikely (1.0E-02> L>1.0E-04)		$\mathbf{M} = \mathbf{Moderate}$	$\mathbf{H} = \text{situation (even}$			ı	A	U	EU	BEU
EU = Extremely Unlikely (1.0E-04 > L > 1.0E-06)		$\mathbf{L} = \mathbf{Low}$	`	vent) of minor concern	es	Н	I	I	II	III
BEU = Beyond Extremely Unlikely (1.0E-06> L)	С	N = Negligible		event) of minimal concern	enc	M	II	II	III	IV
Control(s) Type		Offsite (MOI)	Onsite-2 (co-located worker)	Onsite-1 (facility worker)	nba					
P = Preventive (reduce event occurrence likelihood)	H	$C \ge Irreversible$,	C ≥ Prompt worker fatality	$C \ge Prompt worker$	Consequences	L	III	III	IV	IV
M = Mitigative (reduces event consequences) Acronyms		other serious effects,	or acute injury that is	fatality or acute injury that	ర	N	IV	IV	IV	IV
MOI = Maximally-exposed Offsite Individual		or symptoms which	immediately life-	is immediately life-		1			ı	
11202 Transmany emposed emisite menyadaa		*	threatening or permanently	threatening or						
		individual's ability to	disabling.	permanently disabling.						
		take protective action.								
	М	$C \ge Mild$, transient	C ≥ Serious injury, no	C ≥ Serious injury, no						
		adverse effects.	immediate loss of life no	immediate loss of life no						
			permanent disabilities;	permanent disabilities;						
			hospitalization required.	hospitalization required.						
	L	Mild, transient	Minor injuries; no	Minor injuries; no						
		adverse effects > C	hospitalization > C	hospitalization > C						
	N	Consequences less	Consequences less than	Consequences less than						
			hose for Low Consequence	those for Low						
		Consequence Level	Level	Consequence Level						



Table 11.25 Environmental

Hazard	Hazard Description	Baseline Qualitative Risk (without controls)	Preventative (P)/ Mitigative (M)	Residual Qualitative Risk (with controls)
Airborne	Hazard:	L:	See Section I Chapter 4	L:
		C:		C:
		R:		R:
Water	Hazard:	L:	See Section I Chapter 4	L:
		C:		C:
		R:		R:
Soil	Hazard:	L:	See Section I Chapter 4	L:
		C:	•	C:
		R:		R: