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# **Mu2e Remote Handling Review Radiological Issues**

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
March 3-4, 2015

# Outline

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- Facility radiation dose rates (sans major sources)
  - PS Room
  - Remote Handling Room
- Major radiation sources
- Air flow
  - During operations
  - During remote handling operations
- Contamination sources
- Radiation Protection – entry controls
- Operating notes
- Summary
- **Note: All radiation dose units are in the format mrem/hr (mSv/hr)**


# Elevation View




# Plan view - Facility radiation dose rates (sans major sources)

At beam elevation – 7.6' from the floor

Robot staging area




# Plan view - Facility radiation dose rates (sans major sources)



## Plan view - Facility radiation dose rates (sans major sources)

### Robot setup

- Significant preparation time in yellow zone
- Several people
- Several shifts
- Significant collective dose in 16 mrem/hr (0.16 mSv/hr field)
- Change door from SS to concrete to reduce collective dose



# Major Sources – tungsten target

Source: V. Pronskikh  
MARS

## Tungsten target


- 460 Ci (1.7E13 Bq)
- 1350 isotopes
- 330,000 rem/hr (3.3 kSv/hr) @ contact
- 210 rem/hr (2.1 Sv/hr) @ 1 foot
- 19 rem/hr (0.19 Sv/hr) @ 1 meter

## In situ


- Tungsten target is well shielded by the HRS
- Small dose contributor to end cap region
- Little to no effect on dose rates in the PS room

# Major sources – end cap & vacuum window

Source: V. Pronskikh  
MARS run129



In situ end cap @ contact  
32 rem/hr (321 mSv/hr)




Vacuum window @ contact  
Separated from PS  
1 to 7 rem/hr  
(10 to 70 mSv/hr)

Preliminary results based upon a previous end cap design  
The latest design has 10 x thinner windows  
Vacuum window dose rate should be lower!




# Major Sources – beam dump (beam entrance face)






# Air flow during target change out – horizontal scheme



# Air flow during target change out – vertical scheme



Control of air flow for the vertical scheme requires this additional fan and duct. The duct could also be employed for the operational mode and the horizontal scheme.

# Surface Contamination Sources – RHR

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- Contamination issues in the Remote Handling Room are very unlikely unless the robot tracks it in
  - Engineered controls for ventilation limit activated air infiltration from the PS room
  - Used targets and vacuum window should never be returned to the RHR
  - AD ES&H department radiation protection group will monitor/control traffic between the PS and RH rooms to prevent spread of contamination

# Surface Contamination Sources – Production Solenoid Rm

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- PS room surfaces
  - 0.5 to 250 mrem/hr
  - Experience-based relationship exists between:
    - the possibility of surface contamination on walls and floors and
    - residual dose rates of those surfaces
  - AD checks for surface contamination on floors when residual dose rate exceed 100 mR/hr (1 mSv/hr) @ 1 foot from beam line components
  - Measureable contamination is nominally not expected until ~500 mR/hr (5 mSv/hr) @ 1 foot from components
  - Expect mild contamination at the west wall surface at 7.6' from floor (~nCi/100cm<sup>2</sup>)

# Surface Contamination Sources – beam dump

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- Supply air is filtered and dried
- Exhaust air velocity 33 ft/min (10 m/min)
- Air cooling flow is around the outside surfaces of the 1.5 m x 1.5 m x 2 m mass
- Air mixing between steel plates is not prevented
  - Main air flow is over surfaces with lowest specific activity
- Dump steel is to be painted, no rusted surfaces
- Peak temperatures should not lead to thermal degradation of paint
- Paint on entrance surface could eventually become radiation damaged
- Albedo trap should provide fallout region for any air-entrained particulates

# Surface Contamination Sources – beam dump

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- Primary emission for exhaust should be
  - C11
  - N13
  - O15
  - Other short-lived isotopes
  - Ar41
- Be7 will be produced as spallation product in air
  - Primarily deposited in HEPA filter at air dam
- Other gaseous isotopes will pass through the HEPA filter
  - Directed to exhaust stack for decay during transit time
- Expect contamination in the albedo trap, but contributes very little to general surface contamination in the PS room



# Surface Contamination Sources

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- End cap and vacuum window
  - Expect surfaces to be contaminated
    - Multiple nCi/100 cm<sup>2</sup>
  - Would not expect contamination from these surfaces to spread except by physical contact

# Surface Contamination Sources

- Target
  - 460 Ci (1.7E13 Bq) after 1 year of operation
  - Expect extremely contaminated target surface
  - Extreme care required for target handling
  - Post operation surface condition is difficult to predict
    - Could range from reasonably intact to friable
    - Target coatings could
      - increase emissivity
      - Reduce target temperature
      - Reduce impact of poor vacuum
    - PS vacuum
      - Major factor

Target coating	Yes	No	No	Yes
PS vacuum quality*	Good	Good	Poor	Poor
Severity of contamination	bad	worse	Really awfully bad	worse to TBD

\*poor vacuum > 1E-5 Torr > good vacuum

# Surface Contamination Sources

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- Target handling considerations
  - **prevent physical shock & rough handling**
  - provide robust containment for target outside of PS
    - containment should accommodate a broken target, spokes, etc.
    - Catch basin, e.g., plastic bag, SS box, sticky pad, or similar to capture target detritus
    - Minimize air movement
  - move target into full containment as soon as practicable
  - Move target/containment to target coffin
- Target coatings are promising, however
  - Coating degradation could eventually lead to
    - Target hot spots
    - accelerated corrosion
  - Good vacuum quality remains a high priority

# Radiation Protection - Entry controls for the PS Room

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- Once mu2e beam operations begin, entry into the PS room will be under the exclusive control of the AD ES&H department radiation protection group
- Work will be controlled by radiation work permit
- Work is planned by target station engineers
- Approval of work is by AD RSO, or in exceptional cases, by the Fermilab Senior Radiation Safety Officer
- Pace of work is controlled by AD ES&H personnel
  - ES&H ensures adherence to:
    - radiological check points
    - radiation dose control
    - contamination control

## Operating Notes - Aisle for coffin loading

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- The dose rate in the aisle for the coffin position  $< 1$  mrem/hr
- Staging/manipulating target/window coffins in the aisle is completely feasible for the horizontal scheme

## Operating Notes – robot storage during operation

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- Majority of the robot structure may reside in RHR
  - Absorbed dose calculation is Si sample is 60,000 to 230,000 rad/year (0.6 to 2.3 kGy/y) (V. Pronskikh, MARS)
  - We typically assume service life degradation at 10,000 rads (100 Gy) for electronics
  - Radiation resistant LVDTs and resolvers remain on the machine
  - Electronic components are removable by quick disconnect cables prior to beam operation

## Operating Notes – PS Room Access

- It should be possible to shield the major sources in the PS room to allow personnel access
  - Stack shielding across PS window
    - Lift truck
    - 3' X 3' X 6' C blocks
  - Stack concrete shield in front of beam dump entrance
  - Such temporary shield arrangement would permit
    - PS alignment
    - Other off normal maintenance/repair activity
    - robot assistance


# Operating Notes – vertical scheme service building access

Yellow box indicates remote handling equipment service area

Prompt dose rate 0.1- 3 mrem/hr

Occupancy at the discretion of AD ES&H

Requires radiation work permit





# Summary

- Radiological parameters for the mu2e facility are within the range of experience and expertise of the Fermilab staff
- Handling of the irradiated tungsten target will require extraordinary care considering its activity (460 Ci) and potentially fragile nature
- Application of concrete shields at the PS window and beam dump should permit personnel access to the PS room under supervision of AD Radiation Protection Personnel